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ABSTRACT  
 
This dissertation examines how subtle shifts in language can affect how people construct 
meaning from their experiences. I present evidence from eight experiments (N’s range from 49 - 
193) that focus on two related, but distinct, linguistic mechanisms that allow individuals to adopt 
a broader, more distanced perspective: distanced self-talk (i.e., using one’s own name or second 
or third person pronouns to refer to the self; e.g., “Ariana, you can do this”) and generic-you (i.e., 
‘you’ that refers to people in general; e.g., “What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger”). Chapter 
1 provides a brief review of the existing literature on distanced self-talk and generic-you, 
highlighting their functionality for promoting psychological distance and emotion regulation. 
Chapter 2 consists of two experiments illustrating that distanced self-talk promotes emotion 
regulation when people reflect on intense, personal experiences, and among individuals who 
score high on trait-like measures of anxiety, brooding and depressive symptoms. The third 
chapter presents one study demonstrating that young children spontaneously use generic-you to 
express generalizations about negative experiences, suggesting that this may be a foundational 
meaning-making mechanism. Chapter 4 examines whether generic-you is functional for the 
addressee, focusing on how it operates in normative contexts. I present five experiments 
demonstrating that people endorse unfamiliar behaviors as more normative when they are 
expressed with generic-you (vs. I).  This effect persists even when participants are told that the 
individuals providing the information are highly knowledgeable, and information expressed with 
“I” should be equally valid. In the final chapter, I propose that both of the linguistic shifts 
  
xiii 
reviewed in the previously mentioned chapters may operate relatively effortlessly, which has 
implications regarding when and for whom linguistic routes to emotion regulation may be 
adaptive. Specifically, it suggests that distanced self-talk and generic-you should be effective 
even when individuals are experiencing high levels of distress, and among populations whose 
cognitive control capacities are less efficient (i.e., those with depression or anxiety) or still 
developing (i.e., children). 
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CHAPTER I 
How Linguistic Shifts Promote Psychological Distance 
 
“Grief had made him novel, and he called himself ‘you.’” 
 –V. S. Pritchett, A Trip to the Seaside in A Careless Widow and Other Stories 
 
In the summer of 2012, 14-year-old Malala Yousafzai learned arguably the most 
frightening news that any teenager could receive: The Taliban had vowed to assassinate her in 
response to her outspoken advocacy against their efforts to restrict girls’ access to education. 
When asked how she responded to news of the terrorists’ plot, Malala said, “I asked myself, 
‘what would you do Malala? Malala, just take a shoe and hit him.’” She went on, “‘But if you 
hit a Talib with your shoe, then there will be no difference between you and the Talib’” 
(Stewart, 2013). She talked to herself using ‘you’ and her own name.  
Several months later, Malala’s fears were realized: she was shot in the head while riding 
the bus to school. Malala survived, but the injury caused nerve damage, making it difficult for 
her to smile. Reassuring her mother that it did not matter, Malala again used ‘you,’ but not to 
address herself as she did in the quote above, or to refer to a specific person. Instead, she 
extrapolated from her own experience, using ‘you’ to refer to people in general: “When you see 
death, things change” (Yousafzai & Lamb, 2013).  
Both of these examples highlight the unexpected ways that people use their own name 
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and non-first-person pronouns to reflect on their own deeply personal negative experiences. 
Here, I propose that these linguistic shifts serve the same overarching function: they promote 
psychological distance, which facilitates emotion regulation in a variety of contexts (e.g., 
Bernstein et al., 2015; Finkel, Slotter, Luchies, Walton, & Gross, 2013; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, 
& Levin-Sagi, 2006; Gross, 1998; Kross & Ayduk, 2017; White & Carlson, 2016).  
One of the most distinctive properties of human language is that it requires people to take 
a stance on any given experience (Slobin, 1996). Language does not permit a speaker to 
represent the full complexity of a moment. Rather, it requires boiling down a richness of 
percepts, thoughts and emotions into a mere handful of words—hence the idiom, “a picture is 
worth a thousand words.” With language, a speaker is forced to be selective, making choices 
regarding vocabulary, syntax and perspective within milliseconds (Traxler & Gernsbacher, 
2011). For example, a person onstage in front of an audience could say either, “I looked out at 
the crowd” or “The crowd looked at me.” Both sentences express a person’s experience of the 
same event, but convey dramatically different ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving in the 
moment.  
In line with this idea, I propose that two linguistic mechanisms—distanced self-talk and 
generic you—can alter a person’s perspective in ways that promote psychological distance. 
Distanced self-talk involves taking an outsider’s perspective by using one’s own name and non-
first-person pronouns (e.g., you, she) to address the self. As illustrated above, for example, 
Malala says to herself, “Malala, just take a shoe and hit him.” Given that first-person pronouns 
are commonly used to refer to the self, whereas names and non-first-person pronouns are 
habitually used to refer to others, reflecting on the self using language typically reserved for 
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others should promote emotion regulation by allowing people to reflect on their experiences 
from a distance (Kross et al., 2014). 
While distanced self-talk involves reflecting on the self from an outside perspective, 
generic-you involves broadening one’s perspective to refer to people in general (similar to how 
one might use ‘people’ or ‘one’). Prior work demonstrates that generic noun statements (e.g., 
“Cats chase mice”) express generalizations that apply broadly, beyond any specific time or place 
(Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). Similarly, using generic-
you to reflect on one’s own negative experiences allows a person to craft a generalization, but in 
this case, one that is deeply self-relevant. For example, consider Malala’s use of the word ‘you’ 
as she reflects on her own near-death experience, “When you see death, things change.” We 
suggest that viewing one’s experience in this way, as part of a broader phenomenon that is not 
restricted to the self, should likewise facilitate emotion regulation by promoting psychological 
distance (Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2017). 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of these linguistic mechanisms compared to the 
default mode of reflecting on the self from an immersed perspective, using ‘I’.   
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Figure 1. Figure 1 describes three perspectives individuals can take when reflecting on the self.  
The distinction between distanced self-talk statements in the 2nd person and generic-you 
statements in the 2nd person primarily lies in whom the referent is. For 2nd person distanced self-
talk, the target of speech is the self; for self-relevant generic-you statements, the target of speech 
is people in general. Generic-you statements are further characterized by “you” accompanied by 
a verb in the present tense, which is not marked by a temporal aspect. 
 
Experimental research indicates that reflecting on negative personal events using 
distanced (vs. immersed) self-talk leads people to consider their experiences akin to the 
perspective of an outside observer (Kross et al., 2014) and promotes emotion regulation in a 
variety of contexts (Dolcos & Albarracin, 2014; Kross et al., 2014; Kross & Ayduk, 2017; 
Leitner et al., 2017). When preparing for an anxiety-eliciting speech task, for example, 
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individuals who were cued to use distanced self-talk were more likely to view the upcoming 
speech as a challenge that they could cope with rather than as a threat over which they had no 
control (Kross et al., 2014; Streamer, Seery, Kondrak, Lamarche, & Saltsman, 2017). They also 
reported lower levels of anxiety (Kross et al., 2014) and reduced physiological reactivity 
(Streamer et al., 2017). 
Generic-you likewise promotes psychological distance, helping people make meaning 
from negative experiences (Orvell et al., 2017). Experimental evidence demonstrates that 
increased usage of generic-you leads people to perceive a negative event as farther away from 
the self in time and space (Orvell et al., 2017). This increased psychological distance is 
associated with reductions in emotional reactivity and higher levels of reconstrual (i.e., thinking 
about the event differently) when people try to make meaning from negative experiences (Orvell 
et al., 2017).  
Individual difference research indicates that people also spontaneously draw on both of 
these linguistic mechanisms when placed in situations where they need to control their thoughts, 
feelings, or behaviors (Orvell et al., 2017; Zell, Warriner, & Albarracin, 2012). For example, 
people use ‘you’ to address the self (i.e., distanced self-talk) when working through hypothetical 
situations that require self-control (Zell et al., 2012) and people are nearly five times more likely 
to spontaneously use generic-you when prompted to make meaning from, as opposed to relive, 
negative experiences (Orvell et al., 2017). These studies demonstrate that people shift from their 
default, immersed perspective to a more distanced one intuitively in situations that involve 
emotion regulation.  
Both of these linguistic mechanisms are also available to young children, highlighting 
how potentially fundamental the capacity to switch from an immersed to a distanced perspective 
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through language is. For example, instructing four- and five-year-olds to use distanced self-talk 
increases their performance during an executive function task and their persistence during a 
boring work task (White et al., 2017; White & Carlson, 2016). Children as young as five years of 
age also spontaneously use generic-you when instructed to make meaning from (vs. relive) 
negative hypothetical events, demonstrating that they are able to generalize from negative 
experiences by understanding them as representative of broader phenomena (Orvell, Kross, & 
Gelman, 2018). 
In sum, distanced self-talk and generic-you provide adults and children with a way to 
shift from an immersed to a more distanced perspective through the words they use to reflect on 
the self. In this way, both of these linguistic shifts serve as levers that promote emotion 
regulation by enhancing psychological distance. At the same time, because these linguistic 
mechanisms are readily observable, they also function as windows, providing insight into when 
people are regulating their emotions. In this vein, these mechanisms add to a growing body of 
research on other linguistic indices of distance that provide insight into emotion regulation 
processes (e.g., Al-Mosaiwi & Johnstone, 2018; Doré, Morris, Burr, Picard, & Ochsner, 2017; 
Nook et al., 2017; Pennebaker & Chung, 2007; Tackman et al., 2018).  
Dissertation Overview 
In the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I present three empirical papers to 
elaborate on how these linguistic shifts function both as levers, that affect how people think and 
feel, and as windows, that provide insight into how individuals are construing a particular 
situation. An additional, overarching theme of this dissertation is that these linguistic shifts 
function relatively effortlessly. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, this has implications regarding 
when, and for whom, linguistic routes to emotion regulation may be beneficial.  
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Accordingly, Chapter 2 tests whether distanced self-talk functions as a lever that 
promotes emotion regulation for highly intense, negative experiences. This is noteworthy 
because converging evidence suggests many commonly studied reappraisal strategies are less 
effective under high intensity conditions, which tax the same cognitive control resources needed 
to implement such strategies effectively (Buhle et al., 2014; Raio, Orederu, Palazzolo, Shurick, 
& Phelps, 2013; Shafir, Schwartz, Blechert, & Sheppes, 2015; Sheppes, Scheibe, et al., 2014). I 
present results from two high-powered experiments demonstrating that distanced self-talk 
reduced negative emotional reactivity as individuals reflected on a range of intensely negative 
experiences. Further, these findings generalized to individuals characterized by emotional 
vulnerability. This paper is currently under review (Orvell, Vickers, Drake, Verduyn, Ayduk, 
Moser, Jonides, & Kross, under review). 
Chapter 3 takes a developmental approach, by examining whether young children use 
generic-you to make meaning. It presents one experiment illustrating that young children 
(between the ages of 4-10 years of age) spontaneously use generic-you to express generalizations 
about negative events. These findings provide a window into children’s meaning-making 
process. They further suggest that generic-you may function as an intuitive and foundational 
meaning-making mechanism. This paper is published in the Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General (Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2018).  
In Chapter 4, I begin to examine how these linguistic shifts operate interpersonally, and 
whether they may also be functional for how the addressee constructs meaning. I present five 
experiments demonstrating that generic-you (vs. ‘I’), carries persuasive force, leading people to 
endorse unfamiliar behaviors as more normatively correct. I show that these effects persist even 
when information expressed with ‘I’ should be interpreted as equally valid, providing suggestive 
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evidence that this linguistic mechanism may operate at a more automatic, implicit level. This 
paper is under revision (Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, under revision).  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I propose an integrative framework for understanding how these 
linguistic shifts may operate relatively effortlessly, and discuss the implications of this for 
emotion regulation. Of note, Chapters I and V are largely comprised of an article that is currently 
under review (Orvell, Ayduk, Moser, Gelman, & Kross, under review). 
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CHAPTER II:  
Re-examining Reappraisal: Distanced Self-Talk Facilitates Emotion Regulation Under 
High Intensity Conditions 	
An extensive amount of research has examined the emotion regulatory benefits of 
changing the way one thinks to change the way one feels, a process that is often referred to as 
reappraisal. A core insight that has emerged from this work is that commonly studied 
reappraisal strategies involve upregulating activity in brain networks that support cognitive 
control, which in turn downregulate activity in brain networks that support self-referential and 
emotional evaluative functions (Buhle et al., 2014; Gross, 2015; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 
2012). These findings illuminate the psychological and neural processes that underlie 
reappraisal. However, they pose a paradox from both a basic science and a translational 
perspective, as it is well established that intense stress taxes same cognitive control resources 
that underlie the implementation of many commonly studied reappraisal strategies (Arnsten, 
2009; Buhle et al., 2014). This suggests that attempts at reappraisal may fail precisely when it is 
most needed: under high intensity conditions.  
Supporting this idea, several studies indicate that reappraisal is less effective among 
individuals characterized by depression and anxiety, who are prone to experiencing high levels 
of emotional distress (Campbell-Sills et al., 2011; Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, 
Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Moser, Hartwig, Moran, Jendrusina, & Kross, 2014). Further, 
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behavioral studies indicate that under high intensity conditions, reappraisal is inferior compared 
to less effortful emotion regulation strategies, and in some cases breaks down entirely, leading 
one group of researchers to conclude that “cognitive emotion regulation fails the stress test” 
(Raio et al., 2013; Shafir et al., 2015; Sheppes, Scheibe, et al., 2014; Sheppes, Brady, & Samson, 
2014; c.f., Silvers, Weber, Wager, & Ochsner, 2015). These findings beg the question: are there 
less effortful ways of successfully reappraising intense emotional experiences? 
 Here we suggest that one answer to this question may lie in the structure of language, and 
more specifically, in people’s ability to reflect on the self using their own name and second- or 
third-person singular pronouns (e.g., “Jeff, why are you feeling this way?”), instead of first-
person singular pronouns (e.g., “Why am I feeling this way?”) —a process we refer to as 
Distanced Self-Talk (Kross et al., 2014; Kross & Ayduk, 2017). As Figure 2 illustrates, 
Distanced Self-Talk promotes psychological distance, which allows people to reappraise 
stressful situations in ways that diminish their emotional impact. In one experiment, for example, 
Distanced Self-Talk led participants who were particularly worried about a recent Ebola outbreak 
to draw on more fact-based reasons not to worry, which in turn lowered their levels of anxiety 
and risk perception surrounding the disease (Kross et al., 2017).  
Figure 2. Schematic representation of how Distanced Self-Talk promotes emotion regulation. 
Note that the nature of the reframing will depend on the context of the stressor.  
 
Crucially, cognitive neuroscience research indicates that cueing people to reflect on 
emotionally arousing stimuli using Distanced (vs. Immersed) Self-Talk predicts reductions in 
ERP and fMRI markers of self-referential emotional reactivity (i.e., the late positive potential 
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and a region of the medial prefrontal cortex, respectively; Moser et al., 2017) without predicting 
enhanced activity in neural markers of cognitive control (i.e., the stimulus preceding negativity 
and the fronto-parietal cognitive control network, respectively; Leitner et al., 2017; Moser et al., 
2017). Dovetailing with these findings are behavioral studies demonstrating that Distanced Self-
Talk benefits children who score low on individual difference measures of cognitive control 
(Grenell et al., in press) and highly anxious adults (Kross et al., 2014)—populations for whom 
the effortful control capabilities that underlie successful cognitive reappraisal are less efficient 
(Campbell-Sills et al., 2011; Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone et al., 2007). Together, these findings 
suggest that Distanced Self-Talk facilitates emotion regulation without relying excessively on 
cognitive control networks. 
One explanation for why Distanced Self-Talk may facilitate emotion regulation relatively 
effortlessly lies in English speaker’s habitual usage of pronouns, and more specifically, 
“shifters.” (Jakobson, 1957). Shifters are words whose meaning changes depending on context. 
For example, consider a friend asking another friend how they are doing, “How are you?” says 
the first. “Not bad, how are you?” responds the second. “You” has shifted meaning here, 
referring to each of the two friends in turn. The usage of shifters demands that people flexibly 
shift perspectives, a process that occurs within milliseconds (Filik, Sanford, & Leuthold, 2008). 
Another, related explanation lies in people’s habitual usage of names and non first-person 
pronouns to refer to others, and their usage of first-person singular pronouns to refer almost 
exclusively to the self. Given this tight coupling, using one’s own name to reflect on the self 
should lead individuals to reason about the self from a more distanced perspective (Kross et al., 
2014).   
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Taken together, this suggests that using non-first person pronouns and names to reflect on 
the self may initiate a quick, relatively effortless change in perspective that promotes emotion 
regulation under high intensity conditions. Indeed, ERP research indicates that Distanced Self-
Talk leads to reductions in emotional reactivity within one second of viewing an emotionally 
arousing stimulus (Moser et al., 2017). However, whether Distanced Self-Talk promotes emotion 
regulation under high intensity conditions has not been systematically examined. 
 We addressed this issue by cueing participants to reflect on a series of negative 
autobiographical experiences that varied in their emotional intensity using Distanced- and 
Immersed Self-Talk (see Figure 3). In Experiment 1, participants reflected on future negative 
events that elicited feelings of worry. In Experiment 2, participants reflected on negative events 
that occurred in the past. Experiment 2 additionally examined whether individuals characterized 
by emotional vulnerability (i.e., a tendency to ruminate, worry, and experience depressive 
symptoms) benefited from using Distanced Self-Talk to reflect on emotionally intense 
experiences. By using this within-subjects, repeated-measures approach, we sought to maximize 
statistical power for detecting interactions between emotional intensity and the type of self-talk 
in which people engaged.  
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Figure 3. Self-talk task trial structure and timing. Self-talk trials consisted of eight 
blocks, each focusing on a separate negative autobiographical experience. Within each 
block, participants reflected on their experience using Immersed Self-Talk and Distanced 
Self-Talk four times each for a total of 64 trials across eight blocks. Blocks and type of 
Self-Talk within each block were randomized. Participants first saw a cue showing the 
type of Self-talk (“Name” was replaced with the participant’s actual name), followed by a 
short fixation cross. They then reflected on their experience for 15 seconds using the 
assigned type of self-talk and subsequently rated how negatively they felt from “Not at 
all” to “Very” using a five-point scale (M = 3.06, SD = 1.17). If participants did not 
generate a response within the allotted 3-second window, their trial data were coded as 
containing a missing response. 	  
Experiment 1: Reflecting on Negative Future Experiences 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 50 native English speakers (Mage = 18.66 years, SDage = 
0.82; 29 females) recruited from the subject pool at a large University. The sample was 82% 
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White, 12% Asian, 2% Black, 2% Native American, and 2% multi-racial. All participants 
provided informed consent and were compensated with course credit.  
To determine our sample size, we conducted a power analysis using results from a 
published paper that used a similar within-subjects paradigm. We observed a large effect size for 
the main effect of self-talk, Cohen’s d = 1.01 (Moser et al., 2017) and power analyses indicated 
that 15 participants were needed to replicate this effect with 95% power. Given that we did not 
have effect sizes for the moderating role of how intense the experience participants reflected on 
was, we performed power analyses assuming a small to medium effect size to be conservative, d 
= .20 (Maxwell & Delaney, 2004). This suggested running approximately 53 subjects in a 
within-subjects, repeated-measures design.  
Task 1: Memory Harvesting. Participants were prompted to briefly describe in writing 
eight negative emotional events that they worried about, but which had not yet occurred. After 
describing each event, participants created a short cue phrase (e.g., “Mom’s health”). They were 
then prompted to think about each experience for 30 seconds, rate the negative emotional 
intensity of the event using a 1 (“Not at all”) to 9 (“Extremely”) scale, M = 5.62, SD = 2.19, and 
rate how frequently they thought about each experience using a 1 (“Never”) to 9 (“All the time”) 
scale, M = 6.05, SD = 2.09. In between each event, participants completed a short filler task to 
prevent emotional spillover. Participants then disclosed their demographic data. 
Task 2: Self-Talk Task. Next, participants repeatedly reflected on the experiences 
generated during Task 1 using Immersed- and Distanced Self-Talk (see Figure 2). Prior to the 
self-talk task, an experimenter walked participants through a short training session, which 
included a sample trial and two practice trials. Appendix A contains the script used during 
training.  
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Funneled debriefing. Last, participants completed a funneled debriefing to probe their 
knowledge about the study’s design and hypotheses. Five participants articulated some 
knowledge of the hypotheses connecting self-talk and negative affect in the expected direction. 
However, analyses performed without these participants did not alter any of the conclusions we 
report.  
Type of experience coding. After data collection, two judges identified eight types of 
experiences that participants tended to worry about: those related to (1) interpersonal issues, (2) 
achievement, (3) financial issues, (4) health, (5) events related to the future, (6) appearance and 
self-worth, and (7) morality and religion. Next, the same two judges categorized each experience 
into one of the above categories (κ=.89). Discrepancies were resolved by a third, independent 
coder.1 One category (morality and religion) did not surpass the required number of 15 
participants noted in the power analysis for the main effect of self-talk: seven participants 
generated eight events. Thus, we excluded memories from this category in the Robustness 
analyses, reported below.   
Results 
Overview of Primary Analyses. Because our variables included trial-level (i.e., type of 
self-talk) and block-level (discrete experiences generated during Task 1) data, we ran multi-level 
models using R’s lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Type of Self-talk 
was entered as a fixed effect; Block and Participant were entered as random effects, with Block 
nested within participant. Initial tests confirmed that allowing for random slopes at the 
																																																								
1 The event types for two participants were coded by a separate set of coders because they had 
been overlooked during initial coding. Reliability between coders for these two participants was 
acceptable, κ = .62 
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Participant and Block level significantly improved the model fit (Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & 
Baayen, 2015).  
Emotion regulation. As predicted, Distanced (vs. Immersed) Self-Talk led to declines in 
negative emotional reactivity, b = 0.46, p < .001. Participants also reported higher emotional 
reactivity when reflecting on more intense future experiences, b = 0.26, p < .001. Critically, 
Distanced (vs. Immersed) Self-Talk led participants to experience lower levels of emotional 
reactivity, regardless of the intensity of the experience they reflected on, Type of Self-Talk X  
Event Intensity:  b = .01, p = .541 (see Table 1 and Figure 3).   
 
 
 
 
  
	Table 1  
 
Models testing whether the benefits of Distanced Self-Talk persist for highly intense 
future (Experiment 1) and past (Experiment 2) experiences 
 
Fixed Effects   b  se   df    t     p  95% CI 
Study 1       
Type of Self-Talk  0.46 0.07   50   6.24 <.001  .32, .61 
Event Intensity  0.26 0.02 392 14.51 <.001 . 22, .30 
Type of Self-Talk X Event  
Intensity   0.01 0.02 384   0.61   .541 -.02, .05 
Study 2       
Type of Self-Talk 0.62 0.08   48  7.97 <.001 . 46, .77 
Event Intensity 0.29 0.04 376  7.44 <.001  .21, .37 
Type of Self-Talk X Event  
Intensity  0.02 0.04 369  0.51   .610 -.06, .10 
Note. Models test the fixed effects of Type of Self-Talk (Distanced = -.5, Immersed 
= .5), Event Intensity, and the interaction between the two for Studies 1-2. Models 
include random intercepts and slopes at the Participant and Block level. 
Satterthwaite approximations were used to determine effective denominator degrees 
of freedom, and were rounded to the nearest whole number.  
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Figure 4. Graph illustrating that the benefits of Distanced Self-Talk persist as the 
emotional intensity of the negative event participants reflected on increased. Solid lines 
show predicted average emotional reactivity; shaded areas between the dashed and solid 
lines represent ± 1 standard error of the mean.  
 
Robustness analyses. Distanced (vs. Immersed) Self-Talk did not function differently 
depending on the type of negative experience that participants reflected on, Type of Self-Talk X 
Event Type omnibus chi-square test, χ2(5) = 2.79, p = .733. As Figure 4 illustrates, follow-up 
pairwise comparisons using Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference correction indicated that 
Distanced (vs. Immersed) Self-talk led to significant declines in negative emotional reactivity for 
each type of experience (ts ≥ |3.35|, ps < .001), except those relating to appearance and self-
worth (t = |1.66|, p = .098).2  
																																																								
2 Controlling for Event Intensity in this model revealed a similar pattern of results.  
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Figure 5. Bar graph illustrating how Immersed and Distanced Self-Talk influence negative 
emotional reactivity when reasoning about different types of emotional experiences generated in 
Experiment 1. The y-axis presents (a) each type of experience and (b) the percentage of 
experiences in each category. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean.3  
  
 
Experiment 2: Reflecting on Past Negative Experiences  	
Experiment 2 examined whether the findings from Experiment 1 generalized to another 
common emotion regulation context: reflecting on past negative experiences. Experiment 2 
additionally explored the efficacy of Distanced Self-Talk for individuals with high trait-like 
levels of emotional vulnerability. Prior research provides mixed findings regarding whether such 
individuals benefit more from Distanced Self-Talk compared to their less vulnerable 																																																								3	Note that percentages add to 98% because we excluded the ‘morality and religion’ category 
from this analysis because the number of memories did not meet the minimum threshold 
identified by our a priori power analysis to detect an effect of Distanced vs. Immersed Self-Talk. 
See Method section for additional details.	
1 2 3 4 5 
Interpersonal (36%) 
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Achievement (34%) 
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counterparts, or whether Distanced Self-Talk is equally beneficial regardless of individuals’ 
propensity to experience emotional distress (Kross et al., 2014; Kross et al., 2017). By utilizing a 
within-subjects design, we sought to maximize statistical power and adjudicate between these 
divergent findings.  
This study consisted of a secondary analysis of the behavioral data reported in Study 2 of 
Moser et al. (2017), which used a paradigm similar to the one described in Experiment 1 to 
examine the neural correlates of reflecting on negative past experiences using Immersed and 
Distanced Self-Talk (Moser et al., 2017). However, Moser and colleagues (2017) did not 
examine two key questions we focus on here: whether 1) event intensity and 2) individual 
differences in emotional vulnerability influence the effectiveness of Distanced Self-Talk for 
reducing negative affect. Moser and colleagues (2017) also did not systematically examine 
whether the benefits of Distanced Self-Talk generalized across the range of negative experiences 
that participants reflected on. There were several other exploratory variables collected as a part 
of the original study, which are not reported here. 
Method 
The design of Experiment 2 was nearly identical to Experiment 1.  
Participants. Forty-nine native English speakers (Mage = 20.27 years, SDage = 2.72, 30 
females) were recruited via flyers and advertisements posted online.4 The sample was 67% 
White, 16% Asian, 8% Black, 2% Native American, and 4% who identified with a category not 
provided (i.e., ‘other’). Data from two participants were excluded due to an inability to locate 
their baseline data. We also excluded one participant for whom we did not have behavioral rating 
data.  
																																																								
4 Participants who reported two native languages, one of which was English, were included. 
		
	 20 
Procedures. The design of Experiment 2 was analogous to Experiment 1 with three 
exceptions. First, participants thought about negative events that occurred in the past. Second, 
during the memory-harvesting task, participants were randomly presented with 13 prompts 
asking them to recall specific types of negative experiences. The thirteen cues were then grouped 
into eleven discrete types of events. Participants rated each event’s emotional intensity using a 1 
(“Extremely negative”) to 9 (“Extremely positive”) scale; valence ratings were reverse-scored to 
be consistent with Experiment 1, so that higher numbers reflected higher event intensity (M = 
7.94, SD = 0.97). To qualify for the study, participants needed to have eight memories that they 
rated below the original scale midpoint on valence. If participants qualified, they were invited 
back to perform the Self-Talk Task, which was held approximately 11 days later (M = 10.61, SD 
= 7.88).  
 Individual Difference Questionnaires. At the beginning of Session 1, participants filled 
out a battery of exploratory measures. Three of the questionnaires measured theoretically 
relevant individual differences in emotional vulnerability: the Patient Health Questionnaire 
(PHQ-9; Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001), M = 13.42, SD = 4.61, 
the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), M = 
50.16, SD = 12.81, and the brooding subscale of the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003), M = 1.93, SD = .59. Items from these measures loaded 
highly onto a single factor, McDonald’s Omega H, ω = .53, α = .92 (Dunn, Baguley, & 
Brunsden, 2014; Peters, 2014). Thus, after z-scoring each scale, we averaged them to create a 
composite measure of individual differences in emotional vulnerability (see Supplemental 
Method and Results section for analyses examining each scale separately and additional 
exploratory measures).  
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Results 
Emotion regulation. As indicated in Table 1, Distanced (vs. Immersed) Self-Talk led to 
significant declines in negative emotional reactivity, b = .62, p <  .001. Event Intensity again 
predicted increased negative emotional reactivity, b = .29, p < .001. Critically, Distanced (vs. 
Immersed) Self-Talk led participants to experience less negative emotional reactivity, regardless 
of the emotional intensity of the past experience, Type of Self-talk X Event Intensity, b = .02, p 
= .610 (see Figure 6 Panel A).  
 
 
Figure 6. Graph depicting predicted negative emotional reactivity across levels of Event 
Intensity (Panel A) and individual differences emotional vulnerability (Panel B) by type of Self-
talk in Experiment 2. Solid lines show the average ratings of negative emotional reactivity and 
shaded areas represent ± 1 standard error of the mean.  
 
Individual differences in emotional vulnerability. Of central interest, the effectiveness 
of Distanced Self-Talk for reducing negative emotional reactivity did not vary depending on 
individual differences in emotional vulnerability, Type of Self-Talk X Emotional Vulnerability, 
b = .16, p = .094. As Figure 6 Panel B illustrates, Distanced (vs. Immersed) Self-Talk reduced 
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negative emotional reactivity, even as individuals’ trait levels of emotional vulnerability 
increased  (Table 2 reports all effects included in the model).  
	Table 2   
Model testing whether the benefits of Distanced Self-Talk extend to individuals with 
high trait levels of emotional vulnerability 
 
Fixed Effects    b   se   df     t     p    95% CI 
Type of Self-Talk  0.62 0.08   48   8.15 <.001   .47, .78 
Emotional Vulnerability -0.05 0.08   50    -.57   .573 -.21, .12 
Event Intensity  0.29 0.04 377   7.24 <.001   .21, .37 
Type of Self-Talk X Emotional 
Vulnerability  0.16 0.10   49   1.71   .094 -.03, .35 
Type of Self-Talk X Event Intensity  0.01 0.04 369   0.18   .854  -.07, .08 
Event Intensity X Emotional 
Vulnerability  -0.05 0.05 378  -1.07   .288  -.16, .05 
Type of Self-Talk X Emotional 
Vulnerability X Event Intensity  -0.08 0.06 374  -1.67   .096  -.18, .02 
Note. Model tests the fixed effects of Type of Self-Talk (Distanced = -.5,    
Immersed = .5), Event Intensity, and individual differences in Emotional 
Vulnerability on negative affect. All interaction terms are included in the model. 
Model includes random intercepts and slopes at the Participant and Block level. 
Satterthwaite approximations were used to determine effective denominator degrees 
of freedom, and were rounded to the nearest whole number.   
Robustness analyses. An omnibus chi-square test indicated that Distanced (vs. 
Immersed) Self-talk did not function differently depending on the type of negative experience 
that participants reflected on, Type of Self-Talk X Event Type: χ2(10) = 12.92 , p = .228. Follow-
up pairwise comparisons using Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference correction indicated that 
Distanced (vs. Immersed) Self-Talk led to significant reductions in negative emotional reactivity 
for all types of negative experiences, all ts ≥ |2.98|, all ps ≤  .003 (see Figure 7).5  
																																																								
5 Controlling for Event Intensity in the model revealed a similar pattern of results. 
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Figure 7. Bar graph illustrating how Immersed and Distanced Self-Talk influence negative 
emotional reactivity when reasoning about different types of negative emotional experiences 
generated in Experiment 2. The y-axis presents (a) each type of experience and (b) the 
percentage of experiences in each category. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean.  
 
 
General Discussion 	
Converging research has begun to suggest that reappraisal is less effective under high 
intensity conditions (Ford & Troy, in press; Raio et al., 2013; Sheppes, Catran, & Meiran, 2009; 
Sheppes & Meiran, 2007). Indeed, many commonly studied reappraisal strategies rely on 
executive resources—which are taxed under high stress conditions—to implement (Buhle et al., 
2014; Ochsner et al., 2012). However, people can reappraise negative experiences in a multitude 
of ways. Guided by this idea, we show that Distanced Self-Talk, a relatively effortless route to 
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reappraisal, leads to reductions in negative affect when people reflect on highly intense, negative 
autobiographical events.  
This finding underscores the need for future research to examine when certain reappraisal 
strategies may be more or less effective than others. Much of the existing research on reappraisal 
has focused on a small subset of strategies, for example, adopting the perspective of a detached 
observer or reinterpreting a given stimulus (Arnsten, 2009; Buhle et al., 2014; Webb, Miles, & 
Sheeran, 2012). As a result, little is known regarding if, and when, certain individual differences 
or situational factors might make one reappraisal strategy better suited than another (Ford & 
Troy, in press; McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012; Shiota & Levenson, 2009, 2012). Our findings 
suggest that when the emotional intensity of a situation makes it difficult to adopt a cognitively 
cool perspective, implementing less effortful routes to reappraisal, such as distanced self-talk, 
may promote emotion regulation—while allowing for the adaptive processing of emotional 
content. 
We also find that Distanced Self-Talk effectively down-regulates negative emotions 
elicited by a range of both future- and past-oriented stressors. This has translational implications, 
suggesting that Distanced Self-Talk could be implemented as an effective emotion regulation 
intervention across a variety of contexts. From a clinical perspective, the findings from Study 2 
suggest that Distanced Self-Talk may provide a more feasible route to emotion regulation for 
emotionally distressed individuals compared to more cognitively taxing reappraisal strategies. 
Future research should begin to address these issues by examining whether these findings 
generalize to relevant clinical samples. 
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Supplemental Method and Results 
 
Experiment 1 
Method. Two judges read participants’ descriptions of their memories and identified 
eight key types of experiences, which were defined with the following criteria: (1) Interpersonal: 
experiences involving romantic partners, friends, and family members; (2) Achievement: 
experiences involving succeeding in one’s career, academics or life; (3) Financial: experiences 
involving student loans, finding a job, or losing scholarships; (4) Health: experiences dealing 
with one’s physical or mental health and well-being; (5) Events related to the future: existential 
threats, such as experiences involving potential threats to one’s mortality including car accidents, 
death, terrorism, global warming; (6) Appearance and self-worth: experiences involving body-
image and self-worth related experiences; (7) Morality and religion: experiences involving moral 
dilemmas and those associated with being a “good person,” including those that touched on 
religious and spiritual issues. 
Table 3 provides the number of memories generated for each category, and the number of 
participants who generated a memory for a given event type.  
		
	 26 
Table 3 
 
Distribution of memories for Experiment 1 
 
Event Type Number of  memories 
Number of  
participants 
Appearance and self-worth  18 16 
Financial  25 21 
Future  34 25 
Health  35 24 
Morality and religion   8  7 
Interpersonal 145 50 
Achievement 135 50 
Note. Table depicts the distribution of memories generated for Experiment 1. “Number of 
memories” describes the total number of memories for each event category. “Number of 
participants” describes the number of participants who contributed a memory to a given event 
type. 	  
Results. Preliminary analyses. Preliminary analyses indicated missing responses were 
not systematically related to condition (Immersed Self-Talk n = 101 or 6.31% of responses; 
Distanced Self-Talk n = 118 or 7.38% of responses; z = -1.75, p = .080). Both time on task 
(block number over the course of the task) and time in block (trial number in block) were 
associated with lower negative affect ratings (ts > |1.76| ps < .08). However, Type of Self-Talk 
did not interact with either of these variables (ps > .67).  
Does the effectiveness of Distanced Self-Talk depend on how frequently people think 
about the event?  We examined whether type of self-talk used during the task interacted with 
how frequently participants reported thinking about the experience in their daily lives. The 
interaction between Type of Self-Talk and Thought Frequency was marginal, indicating that 
Distanced Self-Talk was marginally more effective for down-regulating negative emotional 
reactivity among individuals who spent more time thinking about the experience, b = .03, se = 
0.02, t(382) = 1.79, p = .075, 95% CI [-.003, .067]. Both the main effect of Type of Self-Talk, b 
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= 0.46, se = 0.08, t(50) = 6.12, p < .001, 95% CI [.311, .613] and frequency of Thinking about 
the Event, b = 0.13, se = 0.02, t(392) = 6.15, p < .001, 95% CI [.090, .174] were also significant 
in the theoretically expected direction—first person self-talk and more frequent preoccupation 
were both positively associated with negative affect.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
Method. Table 4 provides the number of memories generated for each category, and the 
number of participants who generated a memory for a given event type.  
 
Results. Preliminary Analyses. Preliminary analyses indicated that there was no 
difference in missing data between conditions (Immersed Self-Talk n = 123 or 8.11% of 
responses; Distanced Self-Talk n = 109 or 7.19% of responses; z = -0.20, p = .842). Time on task 
(i.e, Block) was associated with increased negative affect ratings (t = 1.97 p = .049). However, 
Type of Self-Talk did not interact with Block (t = -.61, p = .952). There was no effect of trial on 
Table 4 
Distribution of memories for Experiment 2 
Event Type Number of  
memories 
Number of  
participants 
Abandoned 33 33 
Abused 34 34 
Angry 30 30 
Attacked 20 20 
Betrayed 59 41 
Degraded 31 31 
Embarrassed 28 28 
Frustrated 54 38 
Personal space 23 23 
Rejected 31 31 
Sickened 36 36 
Note. Table 4 depicts the distribution of memories generated for Study 2. “Number of 
memories” describes the total number of memories for each event category. “Number of 
participants” describes the number of participants who contributed a memory to a given 
event type. 	
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negative emotional reactivity, nor was there a significant Type of Self-Talk X Trial Interaction 
(all ts < |.96|, ps > .343).  
Does the effectiveness of Distanced Self-Talk depend on how arousing the event is?  In 
addition to reporting on how negatively they felt when they thought about each experience at 
Baseline (i.e., Task 1), participants also reported how intensely they viewed each event (1-Not 
intense to 7–Extremely Intense scale; M = 7.47, SD = 1.06). Because arousal does not capture 
valence (i.e., how positive or negative the experience was), and to be consistent with Study 1, we 
conducted our primary analyses with the measure that asked participants how negatively or 
positively they viewed the experience. Here, we report the analyses when the arousal measure is 
included as the moderator instead. There was a marginal main effect of arousal, b = .07, se = .04, 
t(374) = 1.76, p = .079, 95% CI [-.008, .139] indicating that higher arousal was associated with 
marginally higher negative emotional reactivity. Consistent with the findings reported in the 
main text, Distanced Self-Talk predicted reductions in negative emotional reactivity, b = .62, se 
= .08, t(48) = 7.92, p < .001, 95% CI [.463 .774] and there was no Type of Self-Talk X Event 
Arousal Interaction, b = .04, se = .03, t(358) = 1.06, p = .290, 95% CI [-.031, .102]. 
Does the effectiveness of Distanced Self-Talk depend on when the event occurred? 
Participants indicated when each experience they reflected on occurred (Less than a month ago: 
18%, Between 1 and 6 months ago: 25%, Between 6 months and a year ago: 14%, Between 1-5 
years ago: 30%, More than 5 years ago: 13%). This variable did not predict negative emotional 
reactivity, b = -.03, se = .03, t(424) = .94, p = .348, 95% CI [-.028, .080] or interact with Type of 
Self-Talk , b = -.02, se = .03, t(359) = -.81, p = .420, 95% CI [-.070, .029]. Controlling for this 
variable did not substantively alter the relationship	between Type of Self-Talk and negative 
emotional reactivity, b = .62, se = .08, t(48) = 7.95, p < .001, 95% CI [.466, .779]. 
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Individual Differences. In addition to the questionnaires mentioned in the manuscript, 
participants also filled out the reflection (M = 1.92, SD = 0.70) and depression (M = 1.96, SD = 
0.68) subscales of the RRS, and the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Reappraise M = 30.64, 
SD = 6.44; Suppression M = 15.51, SD = 4.97) (Gross & John, 2003). Table 5 provides the 
results when each individual subscale is entered into the model as a moderator. To correct for 
multiple comparisons, we used a Bonferroni correction, giving us an effective p < .007 for 
significance. 
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CHAPTER III 
Lessons Learned: Young Children's Use of Generic-You to Make Meaning From Negative 
Experiences 
 
From a young age, children must grapple with a range of negative experiences: they may 
fail to get what they want, endure social exclusion and conflict, witness injustices in the world 
around them, or suffer losses and disappointments both big and small. Learning from such events 
to inform future life experiences presents an essential challenge, but what psychological 
processes facilitate this capacity? 
For adults, one route to making meaning from negative experiences involves moving 
beyond the concrete features of the situation to understand it within a broader, more abstract 
context (Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; Janoff-Bulman & McPherson Frantz, 1997; 
Orvell et al., 2017; Park, 2010; Park & Folkman, 1997). There are various ways to achieve this 
goal, but recent work has identified the generic usage of the word “you” as a linguistic 
mechanism that supports this process by allowing people to reconstrue an experience as part of a 
broader, more normative phenomenon (Orvell et al., 2017).  
Do children similarly draw on generic-you to help them move beyond the here-and-now 
to express generalizable life lessons? We address this question in the current research by asking 
if children use generic-you as they attempt to make meaning from negative events.  
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How “you” makes meaning 
The word “you” is typically thought of as a second-person pronoun that is used to refer to 
an individual or set of individuals (e.g., “That turkey you made was delicious”). However, “you” 
can also be used to refer to people in general (e.g., “On Thanksgiving Day, you eat turkey”). This 
usage, known as “generic-you,” expresses generalizations that extend beyond a specific time or 
place (Bolinger, 1979; Kamio, 2001; Kitagawa & Lehrer, 1990; Laberge & Sankoff, 1979). 
Recent research with adults indicates that generic-you is used to express norms—general 
expectations for how things are or should be—about both emotional and non-emotional 
experiences (Orvell et al., 2017). For example, when asked to consider rules regarding 
commonplace behaviors (e.g., “What do you do on a rainy day?”), people were more likely to 
respond using generic-you (e.g., “You bring an umbrella”) than when they were asked to 
consider preferences, as indicated by responses including “I” (e.g., “I like to read on a rainy 
day”; Orvell et al., 2017). Adults also used generic-you to express norms when they were 
prompted to make sense of their negative experiences compared to when they were prompted to 
relive them (Orvell et al., 2017). For example, a person attempting to learn from a recent break-
up concluded, “You have to accept that you cannot change people.”  Using generic-you in this 
way allows the individual to construct a generalizable lesson surrounding their experience that 
extends beyond the self, thus enhancing psychological distance and promoting meaning-making 
(Orvell et al., 2017). 
Children as young as two years old are also sensitive to non-emotional contexts in which 
generic-you is appropriate (Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2018). Similar to adults, when asked about 
norms for behavior (e.g., “What should you do with crayons?”; italics added for emphasis) 
versus preferences (e.g., “What do you like to do with crayons?”; italics added for emphasis), 
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children between the ages of 2-10 were more likely to interpret normative questions as general 
by answering using “you” (e.g., “You color with crayons”). In contrast, when asked about 
preferences, children were more likely to interpret the question as specific by answering using 
“I” (e.g., “I like to color in my coloring book”). However, whether children also draw on 
generic-you in the context of negative events to express norms and make meaning is unknown.  
Prior research provides mixed clues as to when in development we may expect children 
to recruit generic-you to make meaning from negative events. On the one hand, research suggests 
that executive function capabilities, which are often viewed as the building blocks of regulatory 
capacities, are still developing between the ages of 6-12 (Anderson, 2002; Hofmann, 
Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). Relatedly, children’s theory of mind—the understanding that 
people experience individual beliefs, emotions, and perspectives—is also still developing during 
this period (see Lagattuta et al., 2015 for review). For example, in one study that tested how 
emotional comprehension develops by asking children about a hypothetical vignette, most 
children were able to infer the emotional states of the characters based on facial cues and their 
own knowledge of the world (e.g., falling down will make someone feel sad) by 5 years of age. 
However, it was not until around age 7 that most children showed an understanding that 
changing one’s beliefs can change the nature of one’s emotions (Pons, Harris, & de Rosnay, 
2004). To the extent that generic-you requires explicit reflective capacities supported by 
executive function or theory of mind, then we may not expect children younger than around 7 
years of age to be able to use generic-you to make meaning from negative events.   
On the other hand, some evidence suggests that children younger than 7 do possess the 
ability to engage in perspective-taking and generate strategies to help hypothetical characters 
cope with negative experiences. Davis and colleagues (2010) showed that when presented with 
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familiar scenarios (e.g., not being able to go outside and play), 5- and 6-year-old children 
produced a variety of strategies that the character could use to make themselves feel better, 
including focusing on different goals or thinking about a situation differently (Davis, Levine, & 
Quas, 2010).  
To our knowledge, prior studies have not examined children’s ability to derive explicit 
lessons from personal or hypothetical experiences. Generic-you, by allowing a person to 
represent an event as an instantiation of a broader phenomenon, may provide a seamless way for 
children to formulate lessons. In support of this idea, literature on generic language demonstrates 
that young children have an early capacity to think about specific individuals as instantiating 
more general categories. Broadly, generics refer to categories (e.g., lions, girls, mothers) rather 
than individuals (e.g., Simba, that girl, my mother), and generic statements convey information 
about categories that is stable and broad (Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002; Prasada, 2000). 
Research finds that children produce generic statements by about 2.5 years of age (Gelman, 
Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008), and by 4 years of age children understand the implications of 
generic statements for inferences about groups (Hollander, Gelman, & Star, 2002). Further, as 
summarized above, recent research suggests that children as young as two years old use generic-
you (to refer to people in general) in response to questions about norms (Orvell et al., 2018). 
In sum, prior research provides mixed evidence as to whether young children may be able 
to recruit generic-you as they attempt to make meaning from negative experiences. Given that 
generic-you is produced as early as two years of age (Orvell et al., 2018), it is unlikely to require 
explicit, reflective capacities; further, prior research suggests that children have a grasp of 
generic language and the contexts in which it may be appropriate starting early in development. 
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Given this, it is plausible that young children may use generic-you as a linguistic tool to 
construct generalizable lessons about negative events. 
The Present Study  	
In the present study, we addressed the question of whether children draw on generic-you 
to express norms and make meaning in the context of negative events by presenting children 
with two stories that depicted everyday conflicts. After each story, participants were asked one of 
two sets of questions: one set prompted them to reflect on what lessons the character in the story 
learned from the experience, the other asked them to reflect on how the character felt during the 
story.  
 We predicted that instructing children to consider what lessons the character could learn 
(i.e., to make meaning from the event) would result in increased use of generic-you, indicating 
that children make meaning from negative events by generalizing beyond the individual 
experiencing the event to people in general (i.e., by treating the event as normative). Given 
varying perspectives from research on the development of emotional understanding, theory of 
mind, and children’s use of generic phrases, we recruited children across a wide age range (i.e., 4 
-10 years of age) in an effort to detect when this capacity arises. 
Method 
Design 
 We used a 2 (story) x 2 (condition) within-subjects design. All children were presented 
with two stories, both of which depicted everyday conflicts, and two sets of questions. One set of 
questions focused children on reliving how the character felt during the story (hereafter referred 
to as the Relive condition) whereas the other focused children on what lessons the character 
could learn from the experience (hereafter referred to as the Lessons Learned condition).  
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Participants 
Participants were 89 children (32 female) between the ages of 4.51 and 10.77 years old, 
M = 7.62, SD = 1.64. Data were collected in two waves (Wave 1 = 42; Wave 2 = 47). All 
participants were recruited from two children’s museums in a small Midwestern city. An 
additional three children did not complete the study and an additional five children were 
excluded for failing to comprehend the stories (criteria described below). 
Materials 
 Each participant saw an illustrated storybook containing three short stories. The first two 
stories described everyday conflicts and constituted our experimental stimuli. One story depicted 
a child whose sandcastle was destroyed by another child on the beach; the other described a child 
who was excluded on the playground. Each story was two sentences in length, spread across two 
pages, with an illustration on each page (see Tables B1-B2 in the Appendix for full text). 
Illustrations were included to enhance the ecological validity of the task, and to aid in 
comprehension and memory (Levin & Lesgold, 1978). We counterbalanced the order of the first 
two stories. Condition (Relive vs. Lessons Learned) was fully crossed with story and order. The 
last story always described a positive experience (going to a birthday party). Its purpose was 
solely to end the experiment on a positive note. Children were shown storybooks with characters 
that were the same gender as them. A sample page is presented in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. Example page from the “Playground” story used in the experiment. 
Reprinted from Orvell, Kross, & Gelman (2018). 
 
Procedure 
 Two experimenters administered the study at tables set up in the galleries of two 
children’s museums. When parents and children approached the table, one experimenter 
(Experimenter A) obtained consent and asked the parent for permission to audio-record the 
session. The other experimenter (Experimenter B) spoke with the child to ensure that they felt 
comfortable and obtained verbal assent. During the session, Experimenter A initiated audio 
recording and transcribed participants’ responses while Experimenter B worked directly with the 
child to administer the protocol. The experimenters took turns performing these roles. When one 
experimenter was not present, a single experimenter completed all of the above duties (n = 22). 
Children were tested individually. 
 Main task. To signal that the experiment was beginning, the experimenter told the child 
that they would now be reading stories together. After reading the first story to the child, the 
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experimenter assured the child that there were no right or wrong answers. They then asked the 
child what happened in the story to ensure that the participant understood it; if the child was 
unable to recount the story, the experimenter re-read it to the child. After data collection was 
complete, one coder assessed participants’ responses to this “retell” question. To be included in 
the study, participants needed to mention that the character felt negative emotions and/or the 
main conflict in the story; five children (two 5-year-olds, two 6-year-olds, and one 9-year-old) 
were excluded for not comprehending the story based on these criteria.6  
Experimental manipulation. Based on what order the child had been randomly assigned 
to, the experimenter then administered either the Relive condition questions, which focused on 
how the character felt, or the Lessons Learned condition questions, which focused on what the 
character could learn from the experience. The wording of the questions administered in each 
condition was fixed for both stories, with the exception of contextual details that were specific to 
the story (e.g., the character’s name, the details of the conflict). In both conditions, children were 
then asked several exploratory questions (see Appendix B for all questions administered in the 
protocol). We did not observe condition differences in response to the exploratory questions (all 
ps ≥ .85) and they are not discussed further.  
The questions were asked in the same order for every trial so that children first received 
the questions that focused them on the relevant condition (Lessons Learned vs. Relive), because 
these were directly relevant to our hypothesis. The experimenter repeated the question if the 
child asked for it to be repeated or if the child appeared confused. If a participant interjected 
during the story or questions, the experimenter acknowledged the child’s comment and swiftly 
redirected the child’s attention to the task at hand. 																																																								
6 All results reported below remained statistically significant when including children who failed 
the comprehension check in the analyses. 
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 After completing the questions associated with the first story, the experimenter read the 
other story to the child and then administered the questions associated with the remaining 
condition.  
Once the child answered both sets of questions (i.e., regarding the two stories about 
conflicts), the experimenter read the final story about a birthday party and asked the child about 
the last time they had gone to a birthday party. Finally, the child was thanked for their 
participation and picked out a small toy as a thank-you gift. The experimenters then provided 
parents with a debriefing form and thanked them for their participation.  
After the first wave of data collection, we made four changes to improve the study 
method. First, we added a short warm-up activity that encouraged children to speak in full 
sentences. Second, we removed one question from the Lessons Learned block: “What could 
people learn if something like this happened to them?” (italics added for emphasis), which we 
deemed to be a confound. We determined that this question was confounding because it 
explicitly asked for a general interpretation, and thus may have inflated usage of generic-you. 
Responses to this question generated by participants from Wave 1 were therefore excluded from 
all analyses. This question was presented last within the Lessons Learned block, so it could not 
have influenced children’s responses to the other question in this condition. In Wave 2, this 
question was replaced with, “What did [character name] learn from what happened?” Third, we 
excluded children younger than 5 years 0 months because we observed that 4-year-olds had 
difficulty completing the task. Finally, we added an additional exploratory question at the end of 
the protocol, “What do you do when people are mean?” 
This research was reviewed and approved by the University of Michigan Health Sciences 
and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board.  
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Transcription and Coding 
 We had clear audio data that was recorded with the use of an external microphone from 
67 participants; an additional 16 participants had audio-recordings that were less intelligible due 
to the lack of microphone. Two participants had parents who did not give audio-
recording permission, and there were technical problems where the audio did not record for 4 
participants. When two experimenters were present during testing, Experimenter A transcribed 
participants’ responses during the experiment. When only one experimenter was present (n = 
22), the child’s responses were transcribed after the session was complete. A research assistant 
then checked all transcriptions for accuracy for participants with audio data. Once transcriptions 
were complete, two independent coders who were blind to the study design and hypotheses 
coded children's responses for the usage of generic-you. Reliability between the coders was high, 
α = .93; a third coder resolved all discrepancies.  Once discrepancies were resolved, two sum 
scores were calculated for each participant indicating the number of times the child used generic-
you in the Relive (M = 0; SD = 0) and Lessons Learned (M = .38, SD = 1.16) conditions, 
respectively.   
Results 
Manipulation check. To ensure that the Relive and Lessons Learned conditions focused 
children on the emotions that the character felt and on drawing lessons that extended beyond the 
immediate context of the story, respectively, we content coded children’s responses to the 
questions administered in each condition based on these criteria (0 = absent, 1 = present). Coders 
practiced on 10% of the cases; agreement on the remaining cases was high, κemotionality = .97,  
κlessons = .71, and discrepancies were resolved through discussion. As expected, participants 
mentioned emotional states more in the Relive condition than in the Lessons Learned condition 
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(100% vs. 17%, respectively). Analogously, participants mentioned lessons more in the Lessons 
Learned condition than in the Relive condition (58% vs. 0%), demonstrating that our 
manipulations were effective.  
Overview of analyses. Initial inspection of the data revealed that children never used 
generic-you in the Relive condition. Given that the data were not normally distributed, we 
transformed the generic-you responses into a dichotomous variable (0 = Generic-you absent; 1 = 
Generic-you present) and then analyzed the data using McNemar’s exact binomial test for 
repeated measures dichotomous variables (Levin & Lesgold, 1978).7  Because we made slight 
changes to the methodology implemented across study waves to strengthen the design, we first 
analyzed data from each sample separately for our core analyses, and then collapsed across the 
samples. 
Main analyses. As predicted, participants used generic-you more in the Lessons Learned 
condition than in the Relive condition. This pattern was descriptively present in the first wave of 
data collection, Wave 1: 10% of participants used generic-you in the Lessons Learned condition, 
compared to 0% of participants in the Relive condition, McNemar’s exact binomial test, p = 
.125, and significant in Wave 2 of data collection: 26% of participants used generic-you in the 
Lessons Learned condition, compared to 0% of participants in the Relive condition, McNemar’s 
exact binomial test, p < .001. Combining the data from the two waves of data collection also 
yielded significant results, McNemar’s exact binomial test, p < .001.  Specifically, 18% of 
participants in the Lessons Learned condition used generic-you in their responses across both 
																																																								
7 Conducting the analyses using McNemar’s test with a chi-square distribution yielded similar 
results. The only substantial difference was that on the chi-square distribution the findings for 
Wave 1 were statistically significant, p < .05. We report the results using the exact binomial test 
following recommendations for the low frequencies we observed in cells b and c of the 2x2 
contingency table. 
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waves of data collection compared to 0% in the Relive group (see Table 6 for example 
responses). Among the subset of participants who generated lessons according to our 
manipulation check coding, however, rates were higher: 31% of children used generic-you in the 
lessons learned condition. The majority of participants who used generic-you did so only once 
(63%); the maximum number of times a participant used generic-you in their response was eight. 
 
 
Exploratory analyses. Although our experiment was not explicitly designed to examine 
developmental effects associated with the production of generic-you, we explored this issue in a 
supplementary set of analyses. We combined the data across the two waves of data collection to 
enhance our power for detecting any effects associated with age. We then performed a median 
split on age and re-ran a McNemar’s exact binomial test for participants below and above the 
Table 6 
 
Sample responses including generic-you from children in the Lessons Learned condition 
  
That it is ok if somebody destroys your castle. 
She learned how it feels to have something you worked really hard on wrecked and your 
feelings hurt. 
That sometimes people won't let you play. 
That you should be kind to one another. 
That sometimes people will exclude you. 
That you can't play with people all the time and you have to make new friends 
Note. Sample responses including generic-you from children in the Lessons Learned 
condition (e.g. “What did [character name] learn from what happened?”). Instances of 
generic-you appear in bold. Reprinted from Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2018. 	
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median age of the sample (median = 7.59 years)8. The results of this analysis indicated that both 
younger (n = 45), p = .031, and older (n = 44), p = .002, participants used generic-you 
significantly more in the Lessons Learned condition than in the Relive condition; specifically, 
13% of younger participants and 23% of older participants in the Lessons Learned condition 
used generic-you, compared to 0% of participants in both age groups in the Relive condition.  
Discussion 
 
 A central premise guiding this research is that moving beyond the here-and-now to 
understand negative events within a broader context is a fundamental way that people make 
meaning from experience (Frankl, 1966; Janoff-Bulman & McPherson Frantz, 1997; Kross & 
Ayduk, 2017; Park, 2010). One powerful indicator of this is generic-you, which allows adults to 
understand a negative event as not just tied to the individual it involves, but rather as an 
exemplar of a normative experience that others may similarly undergo (Orvell et al., 2017). This 
study tested whether children also derive meaning from negative experiences in this way. Our 
results indicated that they do. 
It is important to point out that children could have generated many “lessons” concerning 
what the character learned, without using generic-you. Indeed, the questions in the Lessons 
Learned condition focused specifically on the individual character himself or herself (e.g., “What 
did Alex learn when another girl told her she couldn’t play?”, italics added for emphasis). Thus, 
it would have been entirely appropriate for children to generate lessons that were focused on the 
specific event and character. For example, they could have surmised that the child in the story 
should not build sandcastles on the beach, or that the child should never build a sandcastle near 
																																																								
8 McNemar’s Test precluded us from examining the effect of age continuously. We chose to 
conduct a median split because we did not have a large enough sample to examine condition 
effects within finer-grained age groups.
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other people because they might break it, both of which were actual responses provided by 
children in our sample. Thus, it is notable that some children in the Lessons Learned condition 
extrapolated from this specific, hypothetical story to formulate generalized norms about what 
people in general—not just the character in the story—could learn from such a situation.  
At the same time, an important unresolved question is how to interpret the finding that 
only around one-fifth of children in the Lessons Learned condition used generic-you. One 
possibility is that use of generic-you in emotional contexts increases with development. On a 
conceptually related task in which adult participants were instructed to make meaning from a 
negative, autobiographical experience, adults produced generic-you at over twice the rate of 
children in our sample (46% vs. 18%, respectively) (Orvell et al., 2017).  
On the other hand, the relatively low rate for children in the present study may partly 
reflect that they were talking about a third-party vignette. Prior work indicates that the intensity 
of a negative experience is correlated with generic-you usage (Orvell et al., 2017), suggesting 
that this tool “comes online” as the need for making meaning is greater. Thus, it is possible that 
if children were prompted to make meaning from an autobiographical experience, rates of 
generic-you usage would be higher.  Regardless of the reasons for the relatively low rates of 
usage, the present findings indicate that children, like adults, view generalizing to others as a 
way to draw lessons from negative events.  
Moreover, this pattern of results held among both the younger and older children in our 
sample. As a caveat, we were underpowered to detect finer-grained developmental patterns, and 
only a small number of four-year-olds were included in our sample. Still, these results suggest 
that starting at a young age, children are able to use language to make meaning from negative 
events, even as some of the cognitive processes that are thought to underlie this capacity are still 
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developing (Anderson, 2002). Future research should continue to explore this issue. It should 
also examine precisely when in development children begin to generalize from negative 
experiences and whether individual differences (e.g., executive function, vocabulary) co-vary 
with generic-you usage. 
From an applied perspective, these findings have implications for parents and teachers. It 
is well established that children often struggle to move beyond the immediate situation, and 
become overwhelmed by their emotions in challenging circumstances (Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999). Research with children suggests that achieving psychological distance when faced with 
such difficult situations is one way to help children regulate their emotions more effectively 
(Kross, Duckworth, Ayduk, Tsukayama, & Mischel, 2011; Mischel & Rodriguez, 1993; White et 
al., 2017; White & Carlson, 2016). Generic-you may provide parents and teachers with a 
linguistic tool that they can use to help children learn lessons from their experience by 
encouraging them to view negative events as normative, rather than tied to the specific situation. 
Modeling lessons in this way with generic-you may help children transcend the immediacy of a 
situation (i.e. achieve psychological distance) and cope more effectively. Relatedly, observing 
children use generic-you to talk about their own negative experiences may serve as a useful 
linguistic indicator that they have effectively made meaning from a negative event. In summary, 
generic-you may provide a relatively effortless but powerful way to promote coping and 
meaning-making in young children. 
 As suggested above, another important question for future research concerns whether 
children also spontaneously use generic-you as they attempt to draw lessons from their own 
personal negative experiences, in addition to hypothetical third-person scenarios, such as the 
ones used here. Crafting personal narratives, particularly those surrounding moral conflict or 
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negative experiences, has been identified as an important process for promoting meaning-making 
and learning among children (Baker-Ward, Eaton, & Banks, 2005; Fivush, Hazzard, McDermott 
Sales, Sarfati, & Brown, 2002; Fivush, McDermott Sales, & Bohanek, 2008; McLean & Pratt, 
2006; Tappan & Brown, 1989). It is possible that guiding children to form narratives surrounding 
negative events may provide a way for them to more easily discover a generalizable lesson that 
they can draw from their experience, using generic-you.    
Starting at a young age, children are confronted with negative experiences that they are 
driven to make sense of. This study demonstrates how language may support this meaning-
making process by providing children with a tool that allows them to move beyond the here and 
now and derive generalizable life lessons.  	  
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CHAPTER IV 
“You” and “I” in a Foreign Land: Examining the Normative Force of Generic-You 
 
Imagine that you just set foot in a foreign country. You ask a group of locals, “Where do 
you sit in a taxi around here?” One person says, “I sit in the front seat, next to the driver.” 
Another says, “You sit in the back seat, behind the driver.”  
Whose response do you have more confidence in?  
It may seem far-fetched to expect that such a subtle linguistic shift—using “you” versus 
“I”— could influence something as important as the perceived veracity of someone’s advice. Yet 
in this paper, we propose that such linguistic cues robustly affect people’s interpretation of new 
information, informing what behaviors they believe are appropriate in a given context. 
Specifically, we suggest that using the word “you” to refer to people in general (i.e., hereinafter 
referred to as “generic-you”) leads people to consider novel information as more normatively 
correct. 
Norms are often referred to as a ‘glue’ that binds societies together. They provide people 
with information regarding what behaviors are expected, typical, or approved of in a given 
situation (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Sripada & Stich, 2006) 
People may learn about norms in a variety of ways—through broad socio-cultural influences 
(e.g., institutions, family exchanges, rituals), nonverbal cues, observation of behaviors, or 
explicit instructions (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Tankard, & Paluck, 2016). In situations that are 
ambiguous, the actions of others are particularly important for signaling what is normative 
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(Asch, 1951; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007; Smith, Hogg, Martin, & Terry, 2007). For example, in 
Sherif’s now classic experiment, individuals altered their initial judgments of how far a pinpoint 
of light shifted in a dark room to conform to the judgment of the group, leading Sherif (1936) to 
conclude that in situations of uncertainty, “the group must be right” (p. 111).  
In the absence of a physical group, language can serve as an important signal of what is 
normatively correct. This linguistic information can be expressed directly, for example, “Thou 
shalt not steal” or, “In this classroom, students should hang their coats up neatly.” However, it 
may additionally be expressed indirectly, by means of subtle linguistic cues. In particular, we 
suggest that a linguistic device expressing the generality of a behavior may further signal that it 
is normative. Here we focus on one such cue, namely, generic-you (i.e., using ‘you’ to mean 
‘one’ or ‘people in general,’ e.g., “What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger”), a pervasive but 
understudied linguistic mechanism that expresses information about people in general, and which 
exists in multiple languages (Berry, 2009; Bolinger, 1979; Huang, Srioutai, & Greaux, 2018; 
Laberge & Sankoff, 1979). Through a subtle shift in perspective, generic-you allows the speaker 
to expand the scope of a statement to express information that generalizes across a specific time 
or place (Kamio, 2001; Laberge & Sankoff, 1979). 
It is important to point out that generic-you in and of itself simply means that a given 
statement refers to “any person in general,” and, by virtue of being generic, further implies that 
the statement is stable across time. These characteristics may lead people to make normative 
inferences when generic-you is used, particularly in certain contexts. Specifically, in situations of 
uncertainty, where an individual is motivated to discern what is normative, the use of ‘you’ to 
mean ‘people in general’ may lead individuals to infer that a given action is widely shared, and 
by extension, the way things should be done (i.e., prescriptive). In support of this idea, research 
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demonstrates that people have a tendency to infer prescriptive norms—that is what should be 
done, from descriptive information—that is, what is done (Bear & Knobe, 2016; Roberts, 
Gelman, & Ho, 2016). 
Existing research supports the notion that generic-you and norms are tightly linked, 
demonstrating that people spontaneously use generic-you to express norms about both self-
relevant, emotional experiences (e.g., “Facing death changes you”), and non-emotional ones 
(e.g., “You carry an umbrella in the rain”) (Orvell et al., 2017). Both children and adults 
selectively use generic-you in normative contexts. For example, when asked questions that cued 
norms, adults and children as young as two years were more likely to answer using generic-you 
compared to when asked questions that cued preferences, to which they were more likely to 
answer using “I” (Orvell et al., 2017; Orvell et al., 2018). For example, adults prompted to 
consider norms when asked the question, “Where do you go to relax?” were more likely to 
provide responses containing generic-you (e.g., “You go somewhere quiet”) whereas people 
prompted to consider preferences were more likely to respond using “I” (e.g., “I like to go to the 
spa”).  
Prior research, then, has established that normative contexts are tightly linked with the 
production of generic-you. Whether adults use generic-you to inform their interpretation of 
norms, however, is unknown.  
Hints from the literature on generic noun phrases suggest that people may indeed be 
sensitive to the normative implications of generics, including generic-you. It is well-established 
that generic noun phrases (e.g., “Dancers are graceful”, “Lions have manes”) express category-
relevant information that applies broadly (Hollander, Gelman, & Star, 2002; Leslie, 2015; 
Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009; Roberts, Ho, & Gelman, 2017). Importantly, individuals may 
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also use generic noun phrases to communicate norms. For example, people might say, “Boys 
don’t cry” not because this statement is literally true but because it expresses normative 
expectations (Knobe, Prasada, & Newman, 2013; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006; Wodak, Leslie, 
& Rhodes, 2015). In this vein, several scholars have proposed that generic language may play a 
role in the transmission and interpretation of norms (e.g., Gelman & Roberts, 2017; Wodak et al., 
2015). However, no work to our knowledge has directly tested this hypothesis. We focus on 
generic-you because, unlike generic noun phrases, which express information that is tied to a 
particular category (e.g., women, doctors, gymnasts), generic-you expands the scope of an 
utterance to refer to people in general. This has implications for how people may discern norms 
more broadly. 
Research Overview 
Five studies examined whether individuals endorse unfamiliar behaviors as more 
normative when they are expressed with generic-you (vs. ‘I’). In all of our experiments, 
participants were told to imagine that they were visiting a foreign land. They were then presented 
with a series of unfamiliar behaviors, described with either generic-you or ‘I,’ and were asked to 
endorse how normative a given behavior was. Experiments 4 and 5 examined boundary 
conditions by manipulating how much knowledge the inhabitants of the foreign land possessed. 
Across all of our experiments, we prioritized robustness by using well-powered, within-subjects 
designs, and iteratively replicating our results.  
Experiment 1 	
Experiment 1 examined whether people make use of generic-you, which implies that a 
given action is general, to inform their interpretation of what is normative. Because our goal in 
this initial experiment was to provide the sharpest possible contrast between generic and non-
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generic language, we presented generic responses with generic-you and a present tense, non-
progressive verb (e.g., “You eat ice cream with a spoon”) and non-generic responses with “I” 
and a present tense, progressive verb (e.g., “I am eating ice cream with a spork.”).  
To strengthen our manipulation, we created a context in which participants would be 
motivated to identify whether the described action was normative or not. Specifically, we told 
participants to imagine that they were visiting a foreign land with objects that they had never 
seen before, and that they would have an opportunity to talk to inhabitants of the land to figure 
out how to use them the right way. Importantly, participants were told that some of the 
inhabitants were using the objects correctly, whereas others were using them in a silly way. We 
reasoned that generic language, which implies that a given action is stable across time, would 
provide a stronger cue than non-generic language that a given action was correct. After being 
presented with a response that contained generic-you and one that did not contain generic-you, 
participants were asked to select the correct way to use the object. We predicted that participants 
would more often select the response expressed with generic-you.  
Method 
 Participants. No precedent for an established effect size existed. However, we aimed to 
collect data from 100 participants using TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016), 
reasoning that this would be a sufficient sample to detect a small to medium effect in a within-
subjects design. One hundred and eight individuals began the task. Four participants were 
excluded for dropping out of the study, one person failed the attention check regarding which 
action they were supposed to select (i.e. the correct one vs. the silly one), and one person did not 
answer this question. This left a sample of 102 participants (42 women), Mage = 35.47, SD = 
10.55, 80% White.  
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 Materials. We selected objects that prior research with children had established as 
relatively unfamiliar (Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Gaither et al., 2014).  For each object, 
participants were presented with a label (for example, a garlic peeler was referred to as a 
“snegg”) and two different ways to use it, one using generic language and the other using non-
generic language (e.g., “You twist a snegg” or “I am squeezing a snegg”). Table 7 provides the 
photographs, labels, and functions for each object. 
  
Design. We used a repeated measures design with four trials. As a between-subjects 
factor, we varied pronoun order, such that participants received either two trials where actions 
described with ‘you’ were presented first, or two trials where actions described with ‘I’ were 
presented first. Whether the speaker described a given action with generic-you or ‘I’ was also 
counterbalanced between participants. Trials within each block were randomized. 
Procedure. After providing consent and indicating that they were native English 
speakers, participants were told to imagine that they were in a foreign land with unfamiliar 
	Table 7 
 
Stimuli used in Experiments 1-2 
 
Item Label Action A Action B 
 
Snegg Look through  Blow through  
 
Hoon Roll in between hands Slap on hands 
 
Linz Twist back and forth Squeeze up and down 
 
Slod Hold up to eye Fly around 
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objects that they had never seen before, and that they needed to figure out the right way to use 
them. Participants were next informed that they would be able to watch some people interacting 
with the objects, and that “Some people are demonstrating their correct use, but other people are 
playing around and using them in a silly way.”  
Next, participants completed the four trials. For each trial, participants were shown a 
picture of an object and provided with a label, and read two descriptions of how to use the object. 
They were then asked to select the right way to use the object. For example:  
This is a snegg. 
Person A person looks through a snegg and says, “You look through a snegg.”  
Person B person blows through a snegg and says, “I’m blowing through a snegg.” 
Based on what the two people said, what’s the right way to use sneggs? 
o Look through sneggs 
o Blow through sneggs 
After completing four trials, participants were given an attention check that asked 
whether they were supposed to select the action that they thought was the “correct way to use the 
object” or the “incorrect, silly way to use the object.” Participants then completed several 
debriefing questions that probed their intuitions as to what the study was about, and how they 
judged which action was the “correct” one. Specifically, they were asked, “What do you think 
we were interested in looking at in this study?” “Did anything seem strange to you?” and “How 
did you judge which action was the ‘correct’ one?” We also asked participants whether they 
recognized any of the objects, and if so, to describe which they recognized; on the majority of 
trials (92%), participants indicated no familiarity with the objects.	 
Results  
 	 54 
To examine whether generic language leads people to interpret unfamiliar behaviors as 
more normatively correct, we calculated the percent of times each participant chose actions 
described with generic language across the four trials. A one-sample t-test indicated that 
participants selected actions described with generic language 62.50% of the time, which was 
significantly above chance (50%), t(101) = 4.85, p < .001, 95% CI [57.39, 67.61]. There was no 
effect of pronoun order on participants’ tendency to choose generic actions, b = 1.97, t(100) = 
.38, p = .705.  
A corrected percentage score, which included only trials for which participants indicated 
no familiarity with the object, was also calculated. Using this percentage score yielded similar 
results: participants chose actions described with generic language 62.09% of the time, which 
was significantly above chance, t(101) = 4.39, p < .001, 95% CI [56.62, 67.56]. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 established that generic-you led people to endorse behaviors as normative. 
Specifically, we found that people were sensitive to converging linguistic cues in the form of 
pronoun (i.e., generic-you vs. ‘I’) and verb aspect (i.e., simple present, e.g., “look” vs. present 
progressive, e.g., “looking”), and used them to inform their judgments of norms. This study 
demonstrated that people used linguistic cues, above and beyond features of the object, to inform 
their judgment of how normative a given action was.  
Although these findings are in line with our predictions, we cannot know if the generic 
pronoun itself contributes to the findings, or instead if they are wholly due to the different forms 
of the verb. Certainly different verb aspects have important semantic implications independent of 
the pronoun (e.g., “she looks” [simple present] may imply a repeated event (Corriveau & Harris, 
 	 55 
2009; Gaither et al., 2014), whereas “she is looking” [present progressive] may be more likely to 
imply a one-time event, in this case, the silly usage (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995).  
Experiment 2 	
In Experiment 2, we examined whether varying only the pronoun (i.e., generic-you vs. 
‘I’) would affect participants’ judgments of which action was the correct one. This provided a 
stronger test of our hypothesis that behaviors described with generic-you will be judged as more 
normative than those described with ‘I’. To provide a different plausible contrast for why one 
person would be following the norm and the other person would not be, we introduced the idea 
that some people were from the foreign land and knew how to use the objects, whereas others 
were new to the land, and did not know how to use the objects.  
Method 
Participants. We again aimed to recruit 100 participants through TurkPrime (Litman, 
Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016).9  Data from 110 individuals were collected. One participant was 
excluded for not being a native English speaker, an additional six participants were excluded for 
dropping out, and one participant was excluded for failing the attention check regarding which 
action they were supposed to select (i.e., the correct one vs. the incorrect one). This left a sample 
102 participants (37 women), Mage = 36.66, SD = 11.31, 80% White.  
 Materials. See Experiment 1.  
 Design. See Experiment 1. 
																																																								
9	A post-hoc power analysis using G*Power3 was conducted after Experiment 1 to determine 
achieved power. The power analysis revealed that a sample of 47 participants would provide 
95% power to detect an effect size for d = .49. However, we expected that the size of the effect 
in Experiment 2 may be smaller when only pronoun varied, so we again collected data from 100 
participants.  
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 Procedure. The procedure differed from Experiment 1 in three respects. First, as 
described above, the generic and non-generic answers differed only in the pronoun that was used 
(‘you’ vs. ‘I’). Second, as described above, we altered the framing of the task. Rather than tell 
participants that some people were using the objects in a silly way, we constructed a different 
context for why one person would be following the norm and the other person would not be. 
Specifically, participants were told:  
“Some people are from this land and know how to use these objects. They learned how to 
use them when they were children, and they have seen many people using them 
before. Other people are not from this land, and do not know how to use these objects. 
They only recently encountered these objects, and have not seen others using them 
before.” 
Third, before each trial we instructed participants to consider that they had first asked the target 
question (e.g., “You ask, ‘What do you do with sneggs?’”). This ensured that the ‘you’ in the 
response was generic, not directed at the addressee, because a question asked with “you” that is 
answered with “you” is typically interpreted as generic. We then asked participants, “Based on 
what the two people said, what should you do with sneggs?” For example:  
You ask, “What do you do with this?”    
Person A person looks through a snegg and says, “You look through a snegg.”      
Person B person blows through a snegg and says, “I blow through a snegg.”    
Based on what the two people said, what should you do with sneggs?    
• Look through 
• Blow through   
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After completing four trials, participants completed an attention check where they were 
asked whether they were supposed to select the action they thought was the correct or incorrect 
way to use the object. They then completed the same debriefing and demographic questions 
administered in Experiment 1. We again asked participants whether they recognized any of the 
objects; on the majority of trials (90%), participants indicated no familiarity with the items.  
Results 
Participants selected the actions described with generic-you 57.60% of the time, which is 
significantly above chance (50%), t(101) = 2.87, p = .005, 95% CI [52.35, 62.85]. There was no 
significant effect of pronoun order on participants’ tendency to select the action expressed with 
generic-you, b = 2.45, t(100) = .461, p = .646.  
We again calculated a corrected percentage score to exclude trials on which participants 
indicated familiarity with the objects. Using this score, participants chose objects with “you” 
56.94% of the time, which was significantly above chance, t(101) = 2.50, p = .014, 95% CI 
[51.43, 62.46]. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 indicated that generic vs. specific pronouns alone can influence whether 
individuals interpret a given action as normative. To our knowledge, this is the first experiment 
to demonstrate that a simple shift in pronoun (i.e., from specific ‘I’ to generic-you) can affect the 
normative interpretation of information. These findings demonstrate that people are sensitive to 
such subtle linguistic shifts, using them to inform their judgment of how normatively correct a 
given action is.  
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Experiment 3 	
In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were given information about how to use objects. 
Our next set of studies sought to extend these findings by assessing whether generic-you is also 
useful for providing information about behavioral customs, which are flexible and can vary 
across contexts and cultures. In the United States, for example, people ride the “up” escalator 
standing on the right side, whereas in Japan, they ride the “up” escalator standing on the left side. 
To figure out the correct way to do things in Japan, an American would likely be reliant on social 
input, and may, for example, look to how most people are acting in a given situation. We 
reasoned that the generic usage of the word “you” might likewise serve as a cue regarding how 
people act in a given context. Thus, Experiment 3 was designed to examine whether the effects 
of generic-you vs. ‘I’ on judgments of normativity extended to customs, for which social input, 
in this case via language, would be particularly important.  
More specifically, we presented individuals with a series of customs that were meant to 
be unique to the foreign planet “Zorp.” Participants were presented with only one statement at a 
time, which described a behavior with either generic-you or ‘I’. This allowed us to 
conservatively assess whether generic-you influences people’s normative judgments when the 
pronoun is presented in isolation, rather than directly contrasted with ‘I’ (as in Experiments 1 and 
2). This design also more closely approximates linguistic information that a person would 
encounter in the real world. That is, typically, people are presented with information from only 
one speaker at a time, and the speaker’s usage of ‘I’ or generic-you may vary. After reading each 
statement, participants were asked to judge how confident they were that “this was the right way 
to do things on Zorp,” allowing us to assess whether participants made an inference about how 
things ought to be done.   
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Method 
Participants. We aimed to recruit a sample of 100 participants using TurkPrime (Litman, 
Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). Data from 101 individuals were collected. Two participants 
were excluded because we determined that their responses were provided by nonhuman robots, 
which complete tasks through automated scripts, or participants on “server farms”.10 An 
additional three participants were excluded for not being native English speakers. This left a 
sample of 96 participants (46 women); Mage = 36.59, SD = 11.60; 80% White.  
 Materials. Participants were presented with eight trials. Each trial consisted of a question 
that asked about customs on the foreign planet; for example, “What do you do before a meal on 
Zorp?” and an answer to that question, which contained either generic-you or ‘I’; for example, 
“I/you give thanks to the gods.” Table 8 provides the questions and answers for each of the eight 
trials. 
																																																								10	We identified ‘bots’ or workers taking HITS from server farms by searching for a GPS 
coordinate that had been widely reported as appearing in a number of academic studies shortly 
after our data were collected. We additionally identified ‘bots’ by searching for other repeating 
GPS locations, as well as responses to open-ended data that appeared to be provided by a robot 
(e.g., answers in all caps, answers that were entirely off-topic).  	
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Design. We used a within-subjects design that included repeated measures for pronoun 
(generic-you vs. ‘I’). Participants received four unique trials with answers that contained generic-
you and four unique trials with answers that contained ‘I’. Pronoun usage was blocked, and 
pronoun order was counterbalanced, such that half of the participants received four trials in a row 
with ‘you’ answers first, and half received four trials in a row with ‘I’ answers first. In the first 
block, four trials were randomly selected from the pool of eight questions. In the second block, 
participants were presented with the four remaining questions. Thus, our design ensured that 
each question was presented only once to each participant and was paired equally often with both 
	
Table 8 
 
Questions and answers used in Experiments 3-5 
 
Question ‘You’ & ‘I’ Answers 
What do you do before a meal on Zorp? You/I give thanks to the gods. 
How do you greet someone on Zorp? You/I grab their left elbow with your/my right 
hand and shake it. 
How do you show respect for your host on 
Zorp? 
You/I do not clean up after yourself/myself 
and instead allow them to do it. 
When do you arrive at a party on Zorp?  You/I arrive 10 minutes early, to show 
your/my excitement. 
Where do you sit in a taxi on Zorp? You/I sit in the front seat, next to the driver. 
How do you dance at a party on Zorp? You/I only dance in groups of 4 people or 
more. 
How do you order food at a restaurant on 
Zorp? 
You/I order your food with your/my eyes 
lowered.  
How do you dress on Zorp? You/I wear clothes that cover your/my 
knees.  
Note. For each question, participants were provided with either the ‘You’ or the ‘I’ 
answer. Participants saw each question only once. For each participant, four questions 
were presented with ‘you’ and four were presented with ‘I’. 
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types of pronouns across participants. The order of the trials was further randomized within each 
block.   
Procedure. After providing consent, participants were presented with a cover story 
similar to that used in Experiment 2. Specifically, participants were told to imagine that they had 
just arrived on a foreign planet called Zorp, which had customs that were very different from 
those on Earth. Next, they were told that to figure out how to do things on Zorp, they would be 
able to ask people who lived there some questions. As in Experiment 2, participants were told 
that some people were from Zorp and knew all of the customs, whereas other people were new to 
Zorp, and did not know any of the customs. Participants were then told to “figure out the right 
way to do things on Zorp based on what [the people] say.” Participants then completed the eight 
trials, rating their level of confidence that “this was the right way to do things on Zorp” (1-not at 
all confident, 7- extremely confident) after each one. 
 After completing the trials, participants answered the same three debriefing questions 
used in Experiment 2, and completed demographics.  
Results  
We analyzed the data using a multi-level, mixed-effects approach. This allowed us to 
consider the fixed effects of pronoun (‘You’ vs. ‘I’) and order (‘I’ block 1st vs. ‘You’ block 1st), 
while also allowing us to take into account random variation associated with the different 
questions.11 We analyzed the data using R’s lme4 package for mixed-effects (Bates, Maechler, et 
al., 2015). We obtained degrees of freedom and p-values for the mixed-effects models using the 
																																																								
11 Because Experiments 1 and 2 consisted of a force-choice paradigm that counterbalanced 
across participants which action was paired with generic vs. non-generic language, we used a 
simple one-sample t-test. In Experiments 3-5, our stimuli were more variable across trials and we 
had additional, between-subjects factors; for these reasons, we elected to use multi-level 
modeling.  
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lmerTest package (Bates, Maechler, et al., 2015). Our model treated Pronoun (‘You’ = .5 vs. ‘I’ 
= -.5) and Order (‘I’ 1st = .5 vs. ‘you’ 1st = -.5) as fixed effects. Slopes and intercepts for the 
effect of Pronoun on confidence ratings were allowed to vary across participants, and the 
intercept for the effect of trial on confidence ratings was also allowed to vary. Because we had 
no reason to expect the effect of pronoun to be different for different questions, and because our 
design ensured that different pronouns were equally distributed across the eight questions, we 
used a more parsimonious model, which treated trial as a random effect with random intercepts, 
not slopes (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017). Indices of model fit comparing the 
two models confirmed that the more parsimonious model was appropriate (i.e., there was not a 
significant difference between the two models, χ² = .21, p = .902). Table 9 provides the results 
for all fixed and random effects included in the model; below, we include the fixed effects of 
primary interest. 
As predicted, participants expressed more confidence that a given action was the right 
way to do things on Zorp if it was presented with generic-you (M = 4.43, SE = .19) compared to 
‘I’ (M = 4.07, SE= .19), b = .36, SE= .12, t(94) = 3.01, p = .003, 95% CI [0.13, 0.59]. Whether 
participants received the block with generic-you or ‘I’ first did not significantly affect their 
confidence ratings, b = -.28, SE= .19, t(94) = -1.45, p = .150, 95% CI [-0.65, 0.10]. Additionally, 
there was no significant interaction between pronoun type and pronoun order on confidence 
ratings, b = -.24, SE= .24, t(94) = -1.00, p = .321, 95% CI [-0.71, 0.23]. 
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Table 9 
 
Model testing the fixed effect of Pronoun and Order on participants’  
confidence ratings. 
 
Fixed Effects b se t df p 95% CI 
Intercept  4.25 0.18 22.97 11 <.001 3.87, 4.63 
Pronoun  0.36 0.12    3.01 94 .003 0.13, 0.59 
Order -0.28 0.19  -1.45 94 .150 -0.65, 0.10 
Pronoun x 
Order -0.24 0.24 -1.00 94 .321 -0.71, 0.23 
 
Random 
Effects 
Variance Std. Dev.     
Participant       
     Intercept .69 .83     
     Pronoun .64 .80     
     Correlation 0.00      
Trial       
     Intercept .20 .45     
     Residual 1.46 1.21     
Note. Degrees of freedom rounded to the nearest one. CI represents 95% 
confidence interval. 	
Discussion 
 The findings from Experiment 3 suggest that generic-you carries persuasive value when 
people make normative judgments about unfamiliar customs. It is notable that this design 
required participants to evaluate each behavior individually, and that there was no effect of 
pronoun order on ratings. This illustrates that generic-you not only influences perceptions of how 
normative a given action is when it is directly contrasted with ‘I’ but also when it is presented in 
isolation.  
Experiment 4 	
Experiment 4 was designed to test whether the amount of knowledge possessed by the 
informant would affect the normative force of generic-you. One important feature of 
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Experiments 1-3 is that they created an expectation that some of the information that participants 
were exposed to may be incorrect, either because the inhabitants of the foreign land were using 
the objects in a silly way (Experiment 1) or because some inhabitants were new to the land and 
did not know how to do things there (Experiments 2 and 3). In Experiments 2 and 3, we reasoned 
that this framing might lead participants to infer that a “new arrival” to Zorp would be more 
likely to answer a question specifically (i.e., with ‘I’), describing how they, personally, would act 
in given situation, whereas a “native” would be more likely to answer for the group, using 
generic-you.  
One question arising from these studies, then, is whether individuals would still be 
sensitive to the generic usage of ‘you’ when there was no “new arrival” – that is, when all 
informants knew the norms. If the recipient of information (in this case, the participant) knows 
that everyone that they are speaking to knows the norms, then the pronoun that the informant 
uses to express how things are done in a given context may not matter. If, however, linguistic 
cues influence judgments above and beyond other information that individuals may have access 
to, then generic-you statements may still nudge people to endorse norms more highly, even when 
everyone is highly knowledgeable. By stipulating that all the inhabitants in the foreign land are 
knowledgeable about how to do things there, we provide an even stronger test of the effects of 
generic-you on people’s perceptions of norms. 
To this end, Experiment 4 included a between-subjects factor that manipulated how much 
knowledge the inhabitants of Zorp had. Some participants were given the same cover story as in 
Experiment 3, in which some people knew how to do things on Zorp, whereas other people did 
not know how to do things there (referred to hereinafter as the Variable Knowledge Condition). 
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Other participants were told that everyone knew the customs on Zorp (referred to hereinafter as 
the High Knowledge Condition).  
 Within the Variable Knowledge Condition, we expected the findings from Experiment 3 
to replicate, with a significant effect of generic-you on participants’ confidence ratings. In 
contrast, we had two competing predictions regarding the High Knowledge condition. On the 
one hand, it is possible that participants would infer normativity from a single individual, given 
that they know that every informant is knowledgeable about the customs on Zorp. If this were 
the case, we could expect to observe a significant Pronoun X Knowledge interaction, with no 
difference between generic-you and ‘I’ ratings in the High Knowledge condition. On the other 
hand, it is possible that generic-you may nudge interpretations of normativity even when 
participants have no reason to doubt the normative appropriateness of any of the statements. If 
this were the case, we would expect to observe a main effect of Pronoun on participants’ ratings, 
and no Pronoun X Knowledge Interaction.  
Method 
Participants. Given the added between-subjects factor, we doubled our target sample size 
to 200 participants. We recruited 205 individuals using TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & 
Abberbock, 2016). We excluded eleven participants on the basis of identifying them as likely 
non-human (automated) respondents, following the same criteria outlined in Experiment 3. One 
additional participant was excluded for not being a native English speaker. This left a sample of 
193 participants (74 women); Mage = 37.84, SD = 26.77; 82% White.  
 Materials. See Experiment 3.  
Design. As described above, the design for Experiment 4 was identical to that of 
Experiment 3 with one exception: We added a between-subjects factor where we manipulated 
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the amount of knowledge that people from Zorp possessed. Specifically, some participants were 
presented with the same cover story used in Experiments 2 and 3, wherein some people knew the 
customs on Zorp and some did not (Variable Knowledge condition). Other participants were told 
that everyone knew the customs on Zorp (High Knowledge condition). Specifically, they were 
told: 
“Everyone is from the planet Zorp and knows how to act in all different types of 
situations. They learned the customs of Zorp when they were children, and have seen 
many people doing them before.”  
Participants in both conditions were then told, “Please try to figure out the right way to do things 
on Zorp based on what [the people] say.”  
Thus, our design consisted of a 2 (Knowledge: High Knowledge vs. Variable 
Knowledge) X 2 (Pronoun: You vs. I) X 2 (Order: ‘You’ block first vs. ‘I’ block first) design, 
where Knowledge and Order were between-subjects factors, and Pronoun was a within-subject 
factor. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 3; participants completed the eight trials 
(for each, rating their level of confidence that “this was the right way to do things on Zorp” on a 
1-7 scale), and then completed the same debriefing questions and demographics information.  
Results 
Overview. We used the same R packages described in Experiment 3 to analyze the data. 
We entered Pronoun (‘You’ = .5 vs. ‘I’ = -.5), Order (‘I’ 1st = .5 vs. ‘You’ 1st = -5), Condition 
(High Knowledge = .5 vs. Variable Knowledge = -.5), and all interaction terms as fixed effects. 
As in the previous model, trial was entered as a random effect. Slopes and intercepts for the 
effect of pronoun on confidence ratings were allowed to vary across participants, and the 
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intercept for the effect of trial on confidence ratings was also allowed to vary. Table 10 provides 
the results for all fixed and random effects included in the model; below, we include the fixed 
effects of primary interest. 
Main analyses. As expected, participants in the High Knowledge condition were more 
confident overall that the behaviors described were the right way to do things on Zorp (p < .001), 
providing validation that participants attended to the knowledge manipulation. 
Consistent with our prior experiments, we observed a main effect of Pronoun, indicating 
that participants endorsed norms described with generic-you (Myou = 4.75, SE = .17) more highly 
than those described with ‘I’ (MI = 4.53, SE= .17), b = .22, SE= 0.07, t(189) = 3.10, p = .002, 
95% CI [0.08, 0.36]. We did not, however, observe a significant Condition X Pronoun 
interaction (b = 0.19, SE= 0.14, t(190) = 1.34 p = .181, 95% CI [-.09, .47]; High Knowledge: 
Myou	= 5.29, SE = .19, MI = 4.97, SE= .18; Variable Knowledge: Myou = 4.21, SE= .19, MI = 4.09, 
SE = .18). The lack of a significant Condition X Pronoun interaction indicates that the amount of 
knowledge that informants possessed did not differentially affect the normative force of generic-
you on participants’ judgments. 
Whether participants received the block with generic-you or ‘I’ first did not significantly 
affect their confidence ratings (p = .812), and there were no other significant interactions (all ps 
> .392). 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 were consistent with those obtained in the prior experiments: 
behaviors expressed with generic-you were rated as more normatively correct than those 
expressed with ‘I’. Moreover, the effect of pronoun on participants’ ratings of correctness did not 
vary depending on how much knowledge the inhabitants of Zorp were said to have about how to 
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do things there. Crucially, this finding was not due to a lack of sensitivity to the two knowledge 
conditions, because confidence ratings of how correct a given action was were substantially 
higher overall in the High Knowledge (vs. Variable Knowledge) condition.  
Experiment 5 	
To strengthen our confidence in these findings, we conducted Experiment 5, with several 
minor methodological changes to rule out alternative explanations for the lack of a significant 
Condition X Knowledge interaction. These changes were meant to rule out any possibility that 
participants may have questioned how reliable the “High Knowledge” informants were. 
Method 
Participants. Our intended sample size was 200 participants recruited through TurkPrime 
(Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). Data from 219 participants were collected. We 
excluded twenty participants on the basis of having identified them as likely non-human 
(automated) respondents, following the same criteria described in Experiment 3. An additional 
10 participants dropped out of the study or opened the “HIT” and did not complete it, four 
participants were excluded on the basis of not being native English speakers, one person did not 
provide consent, and one response was excluded because another (earlier) response was collected 
from the same IP address. Finally, we excluded 25 participants who failed the attention check 
regarding how much knowledge the inhabitants of Zorp had. This left a sample of 158 
participants (83 women); Mage = 36.44, SD = 11.00, 84% White.  
 Materials. See Experiments 3 and 4.  
Design. As in Experiment 4, our design consisted of a 2 (Knowledge: High Knowledge 
vs. Variable Knowledge) X 2 (Pronoun: ‘You’ vs. ‘I’) X 2 (Order: ‘You’ block first vs. ‘I’ block 
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first) design, where Knowledge and Order were between subjects factors, and Pronoun was a 
within subjects factor.  
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 5 was similar to that used in Experiment 4, 
with the following minor adjustments. First, within the High Knowledge condition, the directions 
clarified that these inhabitants not only knew the rules, but followed them (addition is illustrated 
here in bold, but was not bolded for participants):  
“Everyone is from the planet Zorp and knows how to act in all different types of 
situations. They learned the customs of Zorp when they were children, have seen many 
people doing them before, and they always do things the right way.”  
We also removed the phrase, “Please try to figure out the right way to do things on Zorp based 
on what they say” from this condition. We reasoned that this phrase may have introduced 
potential confusion, because it implied that there was “something to figure out” even though 
participants in this condition had been told that all inhabitants knew how to act on Zorp. The 
dependent variable was the same as in Experiments 3 and 4: on each trial, participants rated their 
level of confidence that “this was the right way to do things on Zorp,” on a 1-7 scale. 
Results 
  We used the same analytic approach described in Experiment 4. Table 10 provides the 
results for all fixed and random effects included in the model; below, we include the fixed effects 
of primary interest.  
Main analyses. As expected, participants in the High Knowledge condition were more 
confident overall than those in the Variable Knowledge condition that the behaviors described 
were the right way to do things on Zorp (p < .001), again validating the knowledge manipulation.  
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Replicating our previous experiments, we observed a significant main effect of Pronoun: 
participants provided higher confidence ratings of the behaviors when they were described with 
generic-you (M = 5.01, SE = .18) as opposed to “I” (M = 4.73, SE = .17), b = .28, SE = 0.08, 
t(152) = 3.42 p = .001, 95% CI [0.12, 0.43]. Further replicating Experiment 4, there was no 
Condition X Pronoun interaction, indicating that participants’ endorsement of norms expressed 
with generic-you did not vary based on how knowledgeable their informants were (b = -.21, SE = 
0.16, t(153) = -1.27, p = .206, 95% CI [-0.52, 0.11]; High Knowledge: Myou = 5.73, SE = .20, MI	 
= 5.56, SE = .20; Variable Knowledge: Myou	 = 4.29, SE = .20, MI	 = 3.91, SE= .20).   
Whether participants received the block with generic-you or “I” first did not significantly 
affect their confidence ratings (p = .629), and there were no other significant interactions (all ps 
> .20).  
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Discussion 
This experiment provides further evidence that generic-you influences the extent to 
which a given behavior is interpreted as normative. Moreover, our results from Experiments 4 
and 5 indicate that generic-you nudges participants’ endorsements of behaviors compared to ‘I’, 
and this effect is not dependent on how knowledgeable the informants providing the information 
are.   
General Discussion 	
 The ability to deduce what norms govern a certain situation is an essential component of 
social life. Across five studies, we find that a subtle linguistic mechanism, the generic usage of 
‘you’, has a consistent effect on people’s interpretation of whether a behavior reflects a group 
norm. While prior studies have focused on how context leads people to shift their use of 
pronouns—producing ‘I’ when discussing preferences and ‘you’ when discussing norms (Orvell 
et al., 2017)—to our knowledge this is the first set of studies to examine how these linguistic 
shifts are interpreted. Given this, these results demonstrate that generic-you is functional not just 
for the speaker, but for the listener as well. Specifically, they illustrate that whether a pronoun is 
personal (i.e., ‘I’) or general (i.e., generic-you) can meaningfully affect how a listener interprets 
a message.  
These experiments provide a particularly strong test of our hypothesis. In Experiment 1, 
we found that multiple linguistic cues of genericity (pronoun plus verb aspect) produce strong 
effects regarding how normative a given behavior is judged to be. In Experiment 2, we found 
that these results persisted when only the pronoun (‘I’ vs. generic-you) varied. In Experiments 3-
5, we presented participants with identical content, varying only a single word (‘you’ or ‘I’) 
across trials, to examine the effect of pronoun in isolation. In all of our experiments, we provided 
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participants with minimal context. Given this, it would not have been surprising if participants 
had focused exclusively on the content being expressed, and how plausible it seemed. For 
example, in Experiments 1-2, participants may have tried to deduce the correct action from the 
shape of the object. In Experiments 3-5, they may have tried to consider whether a given custom 
may be logical in other cultural contexts. Indeed, many participants noted that they did just this 
in their debriefing responses; for example, one participant said that they tried to consider “If the 
custom sounded believable.” Given that people try to use whatever world knowledge they 
possess to make inferences about others’ behaviors, it is striking that pronoun alone affected 
responses above and beyond content.  
It is also interesting that participants made inferences about norms. From a strictly literal 
interpretation, generic-you simply expresses that the information is general, extending beyond a 
single individual, but it does not say anything about which behaviors are correct or appropriate; 
this is an added semantic implication. It is also perfectly acceptable for people to endorse or 
express norms personally (e.g., “I brush my teeth in the morning and at night”; “I put cream in 
my coffee”). A personal endorsement could even be viewed as more powerful, because the 
person is tying themselves to the behavior, which could make them appear more trustworthy. 
And yet we found that participants were consistently swayed by the generic language. 
One important question for future research concerns the extent to which generic-you 
influences people’s judgments outside of their conscious awareness. Anecdotally, people often 
do not seem to notice when they have shifted from “I” to generic-you when they are speaking, 
and may realize only when miscommunications arise.  Similarly, people seem to quickly deduce 
whether a “you” is generic (i.e., referring to people in general and/or the speaker herself) or 
canonical (i.e., referring to addressee) when in conversation with others. For example, if a 
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mother said “You forget the pain of childbirth once it’s over” the man in conversation with her 
would not infer that the ‘you’ was referring to him, specifically (Gast, Deringer, Haas, & Rudolf, 
2015).  In this way, it is plausible that generic-you may be processed rapidly, intuitively, and 
relatively effortlessly (Orvell, Ayduk, Moser, Gelman, & Kross, under revision). Consistent with 
this suggestion, our debriefing data indicate that the vast majority of participants (> 90%) did not 
mention using the change in pronoun to inform their judgments. This is suggestive that people 
may be influenced by generic-you, even when not explicitly aware of its presence and/or 
relevance. Future research should examine this question more directly and explore the extent to 
which such subtle shifts in pronouns operate outside of individuals’ explicit, conscious 
awareness.  
 These findings also raise several additional directions for future research. Prior research 
has examined how generic noun phrases (e.g., “Blickets eat vegetables”) vs. specific phrases 
(e.g., “This Blicket eats vegetables”) can inform people’s interpretations of how widely spread a 
behavior or trait is for members of a given category (in this case, Blickets) (Gelman, Ware, & 
Kleinberg, 2010; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). However, no research has directly tested 
whether generic noun statements lead people to endorse normative information more highly. At 
times, inferring normativity from generic noun statements could be beneficial; for example, 
“Friends don’t let friends drink and drive” undoubtedly expresses a useful social norm. On the 
other hand, in some contexts, inferring normativity from such statements could have harmful 
consequences, leading to norms that perpetuate social inequality or stereotypes, for example, 
“Women take care, men take charge” (Gelman et al., 2010; Rhodes et al., 2012). 
 Another question for future research is when in development children may be influenced 
by generic-you. Children are constantly trying to piece together parts of their social world, 
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identifying norms that apply in the classroom, at home, or on the playground (Gockeritz, 
Schmidt, & Tomasello, 2014; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). 
Research suggests that children, like adults, rely on language to help them discern new norms. 
For example, children are sensitive to generic noun phrases, using them to inform their 
judgments of group members who are not conforming to a certain behavior (Roberts et al., 
2017). We also know from prior research that young children are sensitive to contexts in which 
generic-you is appropriate, using it to describe norms rather than preferences (Orvell et al., 
2018). Given this, young children may also rely on generic-you to inform their judgments of 
norms.  
 Finally, although the magnitude of the effect of generic-you in these studies was modest, 
our findings raise the possibility that generic-you may affect people’s interpretations of norms in 
more consequential contexts including health or sustainability practices (e.g. perceptions of 
norms regarding alcohol consumption, recycling etc.). Whereas attitudes are often formed based 
on life experiences, and are difficult to change because they are connected to personal beliefs, 
people’s perceptions of norms are often easier to move around in ways that have implications for 
behavior (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Indeed, interventions that highlight descriptive norms have 
been used effectively in the past to change people’s behavior related to voting (Gerber & Rogers, 
2009), environmental sustainability (Cialdini et al., 2006; Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 
2008), and people’s intentions to confront prejudice (Bennett & Sekaquaptewa, 2014). Although 
descriptive norm interventions can, at times, backfire (e.g., Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, 
& Griskevicius, 2007), it is possible that generic-you could be leveraged to change people’s 
perceptions of norms, and potentially their subsequent behavior, in certain contexts. Further, it is 
possible that the magnitude of our effects may actually increase in domains that are self-relevant. 
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Conclusion 
In sum, these findings add to a growing body of research that illuminates how small shifts 
in language can serve as a window, revealing how people are processing their environment, and 
as a lever, that can affect how people interact with their environment, in this case, leading them 
to perceive certain behaviors as more normative.  
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CHAPTER V 
A Relatively Effortless Route to Emotion Regulation? 	
I began by proposing that the structure of language allows people to gain psychological 
distance through the words they use when reflecting on the self. Here, I advance the hypothesis 
that adopting these linguistic shifts through usage of distanced self-talk or generic-you occurs 
relatively seamlessly, and thus may provide people with a less effortful route to emotion 
regulation compared to other cognitive emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal.  
This hypothesis is supported by the linguistic concept of “shifters” or “deixis,” which are 
words whose meaning changes depending on who the speaker is (e.g. Jakobson, 1956). These 
include personal pronouns (such as ‘I’ and ‘you’) as well as other words (e.g., here, there, this, 
that) that situate a speaker in a given context. The hallmark of deixis is that their referents change 
as a function of context. For example, if Dylan asks, “Can you pass me the cookies?” and Ariana 
replies, “Here you go,” the referent of ‘you’ changes, referring to Ariana first and Dylan second. 
By age two, most children grasp the shifting nature of pronouns—using ‘me’ to refer to the self 
and ‘you’ to refer to others, and understand that others do the same. Moreover, at this young age, 
children flexibly shift between canonical and generic uses of ‘you’ (Orvell et al., 2018). This 
sensitivity reveals an early appreciation that perspective is fluid and context-sensitive. Starting 
early in development and continuing into adulthood, then, individuals repeatedly and flexibly 
shift perspective to communicate. Further, they do so habitually, and extremely quickly—within 
milliseconds (Filik, Sanford, & Leuthold, 2008).  
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My colleagues and I suggest, therefore, that adopting different perspectives on the self is 
intrinsic to language use, highly practiced, and entrenched in everyday communicative practices, 
providing people with the ability to seamlessly shift from an immersed to a distanced 
perspective. The psychological distance afforded by these linguistic shifts may thus facilitate 
emotion regulation relatively effortlessly.  
Our conceptualization of effort is largely informed by research in cognitive neuroscience, 
which demonstrates that traditionally studied cognitive emotion regulation strategies—most 
notably, reappraisal—require cognitive control, relying on fronto-parietal circuitry (i.e., the 
dlPFC, vlPFC, dACC, dmPFC) to effectively down-regulate affective processing in other areas 
of the brain, principally those that are involved in generating emotional responses (e.g., 
Braunstein, Gross, & Ochsner, 2017; Buhle, 2014).  
Empirical evidence 
Three lines of evidence provide initial support for the hypothesis that these linguistic 
shifts may provide people with a relatively effortless route to emotion regulation.   
First, a pair of ERP and fMRI experiments illustrates that reflecting on negative emotions 
using distanced (vs. immersed) self-talk reduces self-reported negative affect and neural activity 
associated with self-referential emotional processing without leading to increased brain activity 
in regions identified a priori as being associated with the effortful control of emotion (Moser et 
al., 2017). These findings stand in contrast to a large body of research linking the efficacy of 
traditionally studied reappraisal strategies, including those that target enhanced psychological 
distance (e.g., adopt the perspective of a detached observer), to increased activation in these 
same cognitive control networks (for review, see Buhle et al., 2014).  
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Another way to examine the role of effort as it relates to distanced self-talk and generic-
you is by examining how they operate under stress, which taxes the same cognitive control 
networks needed to successfully implement traditionally studied reappraisal strategies (Arnsten, 
2009; Buhle et al., 2014). In this vein, several studies indicate that reappraisal is less effective 
under intensely stressful conditions (Raio et al., 2013; Shafir et al., 2015). To the extent that 
linguistic shifters rely less on cognitive control networks when used in the context of emotion 
regulation, we would not expect emotional intensity to influence their effectiveness. Consistent 
with this idea, the experiments described in Chapter II of this dissertation demonstrate that 
distanced self-talk is effective for down-regulating negative affect, even when people reflect on 
highly stressful experiences. 
Finally, a third way to examine the issue of effort is by considering how these linguistic 
mechanisms operate developmentally, when cognitive control networks such as the fronto-
parietal network are still developing (Anderson, 2002). Several studies indicate that young 
children, including those with low levels of executive function and effortful control, benefit from 
distanced self-talk in situations that require emotion regulation (Grenell et al., in press; White & 
Carlson, 2016; White et al., 2017). Further, as described in Chapter III of this dissertation, 
children as young as five years old spontaneously use generic-you to generalize from negative 
experiences when cued to make meaning (Orvell et al., 2018). Given that young children can 
flexibly use these linguistic mechanisms, these findings are also consistent with the possibility 
that using these linguistic devices to reflect on the self is a relatively effortless process that 
promotes emotion regulation by enhancing psychological distance. 
In sum, several lines of evidence support the possibility that these linguistic devices may 
provide people with a relatively effortless route to emotion regulation. In this way, these findings 
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contribute to a growing body of research on effortless, automatic and habitual routes to self-
regulation (Braunstein, Gross, & Ochsner, 2017; Fishbach & Shah, 2006; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 
2004; Fujita, 2011). Future research should continue to interrogate the extent to which distanced 
self-talk and generic-you promote emotion regulation relatively effortlessly, and directly 
compare them to other emotion regulation strategies, such as cognitive reappraisal, distraction, 
and suppression. 
Implications and Future Directions  
This dissertation has highlighted the implications of shifting from an immersed to a 
distanced perspective through language for how people think, feel, and behave. In this way, 
linguistic shifts such as distanced self-talk and generic-you may function as levers that promote 
psychological distance and emotion regulation, potentially relatively effortlessly.  
This has implications regarding when and for whom linguistic routes to emotion 
regulation may be beneficial. Specifically, it suggests that these strategies should promote 
emotion regulation under high intensity conditions, as well as for children and clinical 
populations, whose cognitive control networks are less efficient.  
In this vein, one pressing question for future research is whether these effects generalize 
to clinical populations who experience persistent, elevated negative emotions, such as those with 
anxiety and depression. Such psychopathology is characterized by excessive self-focus and 
deficits in the efficiency of the cognitive control networks required to down-regulate negative 
affect (Johnstone et al., 2007; Mor & Winquist, 2002). Given this, linguistic distancing may 
provide a more amenable solution for clinical populations compared to existing cognitive 
emotion regulation strategies, which rely heavily on cognitive control networks that are already 
taxed among these groups (Erk et al., 2010; Johnstone et al., 2007).  
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 Another direction for future research concerns how these linguistic mechanisms function 
in other languages and cultures. One question is whether distanced self-talk promotes emotion 
regulation in cultures where people adopt a more distanced perspective on the self by default 
(Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2007). Another is whether the generic usage of “you” in 
other languages (e.g. Arabic, Dutch) or other means of referring to generic persons (e.g., in 
German, “man,” in French, “on”; both can be translated as “one”) promote psychological 
distance and meaning-making to the same extent as generic-you does, in English. 
 Chapter IV examined the implications of using generic-you interpersonally, specifically 
in normative contexts. Our findings suggest that generic-you can influence how a person 
interprets a given message, leading them to accept it as more normative. Future research should 
examine whether generic-you may also have interpersonal implications in the domains of social 
support and interpersonal emotion regulation. That is, in an interpersonal context, generic-you 
could plausibly refer to the speaker, people in general, and the addressee; further, information 
expressed with generic-you conveys that it is generalizable and normative. Given this, it is 
possible that this linguistic mechanism may pull the listener into the speaker’s experience, 
leading to increased feelings of closeness or empathy. This could have implications for both how 
social support is provided and interpreted.  
Finally, because these linguistic shifts are readily observable, they may also provide a 
window into when people are regulating their emotions effectively. Indeed, research has begun to 
explore this question with other linguistic indices of distance (Kaplow et al., 2018; Nook, 
Schleider, & Somerville, 2017; Pennebaker & Chung, 2007; Zell, Warriner, & Albarracin, 2012). 
Regarding the mechanisms discussed here, observing a child use distanced self-talk during a 
frustrating puzzle, or generic-you after experiencing disappointment, could provide researchers 
 82 
 
or caregivers with insight into how a child is coping. Linguistic analyses of “big data” (e.g., 
Facebook, Twitter) may also provide glimpses into individuals’ efforts to cope with challenging 
events (e.g., terrorism, financial crashes), with the caveat that identifying these linguistic 
mechanisms requires a consideration of context and so cannot be automated through word count 
programs. 
Linguistic indices of distance may also serve as valuable windows in therapeutic 
contexts. Observing a patient reduce their egocentric perspective on the self, either by using 
fewer first-person pronouns or by overtly shifting to generic-you or the third person, may signal 
that they are adaptively coping. Evidence along these lines is beginning to emerge (Barbosa et 
al., 2017).   
Concluding Comment 
Decades of research have focused on identifying how people can effectively control their 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. This dissertation suggests that one solution may lie in the 
structure of language, and more specifically in the words people use to reflect on the self. In this 
way, linguistic routes to emotion regulation may be more basic and foundational than previously 
recognized. 
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APPENDIX A 
	
Self-Task Task Training 	
Script used by experimenters to train participants on the Self-Talk tasks presented in Chapter II. 
One of the things we're interested in in this study is the language people use to 
understand their feelings. People report thinking about themselves using different parts 
of speech to understand their feelings. So, at different points during this task we will ask 
you to do this.  
At certain points, we are going to ask you to try to understand your feelings 
surrounding the worries you recalled by using 1st person pronouns to refer to yourself 
(Not out loud). Please try to understand why you feel the way you do about the worry you 
just recalled using the pronouns I and my as much as possible. In other words, ask 
yourself, "Why do I feel this way? What are the underlying causes and reasons for my 
feelings?"  
During other trials, we are going to ask you to try to understand your feelings 
surrounding the worries you recalled using your own name to refer to yourself. Please 
try to understand why you feel the way you do about the worry you just recalled using 
your own name as much as possible. In other words, my name is [EXPERIMENTER’S 
NAME] so I would ask myself, "why does [EXPERIMENTER’S NAME] feel this way? 
What are the underlying causes and reasons for [EXPERIMENTER’S NAME]’s 
feelings?" 
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We will indicate which strategy we would like you to use with a screen prior to 
the worry cue with either an “I” or your name.  
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APPENDIX B 	
Stimuli used for the experiment in Chapter III 
 
Table B1  
 
Questions administered for the “Beach” story, described in Chapter III  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*In Wave 1 of data collection, this question was instead: "What could people learn if something 
like this happened to them?" 
**Only administered in Wave 2 of data collection.  
Note. Reprinted from Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2018. 
“Beach” Story 
Story Text: Sammy is at the beach and spends a long time making a big sandcastle.  
Just when he/she finishes, another boy/girl comes over and steps on Sammy’s sandcastle 
and breaks it. 
Experimenter: Now it’s your turn to tell me the story. What happened to Sammy? 
If child cannot retell story, reread story to child 
Relive Condition Lessons Learned Condition 
Experimenter: How did Sammy feel in the 
beginning, when he/she was building the 
sandcastle? [point to corresponding picture] 
Experimenter: What did Sammy learn 
when another boy/girl kicked over his/her 
sandcastle? [point to corresponding picture] 
 
Experimenter: How did Sammy feel at the 
end, when the boy/girl kicked over his 
sandcastle? [point to corresponding picture]    
Experimenter: What did Sammy learn 
from what happened?*   
 
Exploratory Questions 
Experimenter: How do you think Sammy feels now? (show child  5-point scale with faces 
from unhappy to happy)  
Experimenter: What do you think Sammy will do next? 
Experimenter: What do you think Sammy will do next time if this happens again? 
Experimenter: What do you do when someone is mean?** 
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Table B2  
 
Questions administered for the “Playground” story, described in Chapter III  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*In Wave 1 of data collection, this question was instead: "What could people learn if something 
like this happened to them?" 
**Only administered in Wave 2 of data collection.  
Note. Reprinted from Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2018. 
 
  
“Playground” Story 
Story text: Alex is outside on the playground and sees his/her friends playing ball.  
He/she asks he he/she can play, too, but they say, “No, Alex, you can’t play with us. We 
don’t want to play with you.”  
Experimenter: Now it’s your turn to tell me the story. What happened to Alex? 
If child cannot retell story, reread story to child 
 
Relive Condition Lessons Learned Condition 
Experimenter: How did Alex feel at the 
beginning, when he/she was watching the 
other kids play?  [point to corresponding 
picture] 
Experimenter: What did Alex learn when 
another boy/girl told him/her he/she 
couldn’t play? [point to corresponding 
picture] 
Experimenter: How did Alex feel at the 
end, when the other kids said he/she 
couldn’t play? [point to corresponding 
picture] 
Experimenter: What did Alex learn from 
what happened?*  
Exploratory Questions 
Experimenter: How do you think Alex feels now? (show child  5-point scale with faces 
from unhappy to happy)  
Experimenter: What do you think Alex will do next? 
Experimenter: What do you think Alex will do next time if this happens again? 
Experimenter: What do you do when someone is mean?** 
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